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Introduction 
This report focuses on the leadership of Special 
Constabularies in England and Wales. Special 
Constables are volunteer police constables, with 
the same warranted powers as a ‘regular’, paid 
police constable. There is a Special Constabulary 
within every police force in England and Wales. 
At the end of September 2018 (when the latest 
published national figures were available at the 
time of writing this report) there were 11,029 
volunteer Special Constables serving with the 
forty-three geographical police forces, with an 
additional 314 volunteering with the British 
Transport Police. During 2018, these Special 
Constables served a total of 2.9 million hours. 
Specials perform a wide range of front-line 
policing roles, increasingly convergent with the 
operational roles and contexts of their ‘regular’ 
colleagues in respect of response and 
neighbourhood policing contexts, and are 
increasingly involved in supporting and 
delivering specialists areas of policing. 
The focus of this report on the leadership of 
Special Constabularies is important and timely 
for four principle reasons: 
- Despite the scale of the Special
Constabulary, with over 11,000 Specials
and almost 1,700 of those in promoted
ranks, issues relating to the leadership of
Special Constables have been relatively
neglected, in terms of policy, practice
and research;
- The Special Constabulary faces some
substantial challenges, not least a major
reduction in numbers, having halved in
headcount over the past seven years,
and related significant reductions in
hours of contribution. There are
significant leadership challenges
regarding retention, effective 
deployment, training, support and 
wellbeing, ‘voice’ and representation, 
and achieving diversity; 
- Policing is facing many new challenges
and is under significant pressure to
become more dynamic and adaptive to
change. This leads to key strategic
questions in relation to a changing future
role and contribution for Special
Constables. The future leaders of the
Special Constabulary will need to both
help shape this strategic future and to
lead Special Constables into this new
era;
- There are issues and challenges in the
effectiveness, diversity and consistency
of current leadership models. This raises
questions about how leadership should
be designed and developed going
forward, both locally within forces and
nationally.
The national scope of this report is important. 
At the time of writing, almost a quarter of police 
forces were engaged locally within their force 
areas in some form of review or organisational 
development activity relating to Special 
Constabulary rank structures or leadership. 
There is a lack of commonality of direction or 
sharing of thinking across this work. The reality 
is this piecemeal approach is both inefficient 
and ineffective at coherently addressing the 
strategic challenges of leadership across the 
Special Constabulary.  
Research and evaluation into Special 
Constabulary leadership is extremely limited to 
date. This report therefore makes a significant 
contribution to begin to fill this gap, reflecting 
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the largest-ever research programme 
undertaken at a national level on this issue.  
The report draws upon a range of empirical 
data, including: 
- National survey data of Special
Constabulary leaders, addressing their
experience within leadership roles;
- National survey data of Special
Constables, capturing their experiences
of being led;
- Benchmarking survey data from all 44
police forces, detailing current
leadership structures and practice;
- Qualitative interviews with the majority
of Special Constabulary Chief Officers
nationally;
- Qualitative research data drawing from a
large number of IPSCJ review and
research projects, encompassing
interview and focus group data from
over a dozen Special Constabularies;
- Qualitative interviews with a range of
strategic stakeholders across policing.
The structure of this report 
The report takes in turn various aspects of 
Specials leadership, and is structured as follows: 
- The remainder of this ‘Introduction’
chapter describes the context for
leadership of the Specials, considering
the purpose and objectives for the
Special Constabulary, the leadership
requirement for the Special
Constabulary, and some key leadership
challenges;
- The second chapter explores the
experiences of Special Constables of
being led, followed by a chapter that 
focuses on the experiences of Special 
Constables in promoted and supervisory 
roles; 
- The fourth chapter seeks to summarise
and analyse existing leadership models
and structures and to identify the key
dimensions of the debate in relation to
future developments of leadership;
- The fifth chapter draws upon interviews
with Special Constabulary Chief Officers,
exploring their strategic role;
- A short sixth chapter considers issues of
national leadership, collaboration, and
‘voice’ for the Special Constabulary;
- The report then concludes with options
for the future.
Defining the Special contribution 
Any consideration of leadership needs to be 
rooted in considerations of both the purpose 
and objectives of the organisation being led, and 
of the strategic aspirations for the future.  
There is widespread thinking that the Special 
Constabulary needs to be very different in the 
medium to longer-term, and that this pressure 
for change presents significant opportunities. In 
that context, it is important that a report such 
as this not only considers the effectiveness of 
leadership of the present model but also the 
leadership capability required to envision and 
realise the desired change, and also the future 
leadership capability required to lead that 
ambitious, and very different, future state. 
A challenge for this report in considering 
Specials leadership is that the strategic 
contribution of, and ambition for, the Special 
Constabulary remains only relatively loosely 
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defined at a national level. That national picture 
is then considerably further blurred by what are 
very wide variations in direction and practice 
across a disparate execution of Special 
Constabulary models in individual police forces. 
The Special Constabulary National Strategy 
2018-2023 frames the Special Constabulary as a 
means of ‘connecting communities to policing 
and policing to communities’ and sees Special 
Constables as ‘a key enabler’ of the Policing 
Vision 2025, ‘through their unique and 
privileged position of holding the office of 
Constable, coupled with their integration into 
the communities in which they live, work and 
serve’.  
The National Strategy looks to Specials to ‘make 
the best possible contribution’, through: 
- Ensuring Specials are utilised ‘effectively
and efficiently’;
- Ensuring Specials ‘are being focused on
the areas where they can make the best
possible contribution’;
- Adopting a cultural perspective that
Special Constabulary roles and
opportunities are ‘limited only by our
imagination’, and that ‘provided that
Special Constabulary officers are
appropriately trained and accredited
then they should be able to fulfil most, if
not all the functionality of regular
officers’. This is coupled with a
commitment to wider tasks and role,
across the breadth of policing and into a
range of specialisms;
- Professionalisation, including the
introduction of a national competency
framework, and achieving greater
coherence across issues such as 
leadership; 
- Maximising the utilisation of skills and
experience that Special Constables bring;
- Developing the Special Constabulary
model to reflect new and emerging
policing challenges, including the
‘additional complexities of crime’,
‘emerging demands on the service’, and
that ‘issues such as vulnerability and
safeguarding are now fundamental’;
- Beyond integration with local force plans
and priorities, there is also an identified
need for a shifting in the deployment
focus for the Special Constabulary
nationally across forces to recognise
growing awareness and prioritisation of
‘vulnerability’ in policing objectives
(inclusive of child sexual exploitation,
high risk offenders, domestic abuse,
cyber-crime, serious and organised
crime, counter-terrorism, missing from
home, vulnerable families, vulnerable
adult abuse, concerns for safety, human
trafficking and modern slavery, and
mental health);
- Building on the USP of Special
Constables; primarily that they are police
officers with full warranted powers, are
a flexible asset, and are deployable
across force boundaries;
- Organisational development strategic
priorities for the Special Constabulary
that include raising the profile of
Specials, widening opportunities for
Specials, and developing the Special
Constabulary.
In support of the development of the national 
strategy, the Association of Special Constabulary 
Officers identified potential areas where the 
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Special Constabulary can enhance its 
contribution in the future: 
- Providing resources at times of peak
demand;
- Tackling violence and knife crime;
- Response and detection of ‘minor’
crimes (aspects of which currently
receive limited resource and response,
but which can be significant in terms of
victim experience and community
confidence);
- Roads policing (enhancing resources in
an area of policing where resourcing has
markedly reduced over the strategic
timescale, and in particular in relation to
enhancing visible and pro-active roads
policing, preventative activity, and
supporting and freeing specialist
resource to focus on e.g. complex
investigations);
- ANPR;
- Counter-terrorism, organised crime,
human trafficking, fraud and cyber (all
areas where the Special Constabulary
can provide additional resource and
specialist skills sets);
- Child sexual exploitation;
- Public order;
- Mental health.
Adding to that analysis, the 2018 National 
Citizens in Policing Benchmarking Report also 
identified a pattern in thinking at force level 
which identified three further areas: 
- Neighbourhood policing, community
engagement, schools and young people
engagement (recognising the
importance, and recent trends of
reduction in resourcing in many force
contexts);
- Rural policing and engagement;
- Hate crime and engagement across
diverse communities.
There are a number of critical voices across the 
Special Constabulary who worry that the 
Specials model needs to change more quickly 
and more fundamentally, and see current 
strategy at national and force levels as 
‘incrementalism’ rather than being about 
deeper and more strategic change. There 
appears to be little challenge to the specifics 
about future role and contribution, rather, there 
is frustration at scale and pace, and many would 
look to a greater future strategic energy which: 
- Scaled up significantly, to fully realise the
potential of volunteer models;
- Pushed more strongly the
professionalism and integration agendas,
to create a higher-functioning volunteer
model;
- Would like to see a considerably larger
and more rapid engagement of Specials
into specialist policing areas (so
essentially, consistent with the direction
set out in the thinking above, but much
more substantial in terms of scale).
Linked to some of this developmental thinking, 
there is also a growing enthusiasm to consider 
‘reserve’ models. The concept of ‘reserves’ is 
loosely defined, as it is used across sectors and 
internationally to mean many different things, 
but broadly it involves: 
- Achieving a more direct equivalency of
operating, and inter-operability, with
regulars, (at least for some of the cohort
of reserve officers);
- A stronger emphasis on recruiting ex-
regulars into a reserve model, seeking to
maintain skills and contribution;
8 
Introduction 
- Some consideration of paid as well as
voluntary models (with thinking often of
a ‘hybrid’ model involving both, as is
seen in some US settings);
- A new and strengthened statutory basis;
- For some, a move away from the ‘Special
Constabulary’ name, towards either
‘volunteer police officer’ or ‘reserve’,
feeling that the language of the ‘Specials’
carries a negative cultural baggage.
The leadership requirement 
Arising from the organisational strategy picture 
discussed above, and based upon the research 
work of the IPSCJ and a wide range of strategic 
conversations about the Special Constabulary, 
an attempt is made here to define the 
leadership requirements of the Special 
Constabulary.  
At an operational delivery level, a distilled list of 
the highest priority requirements for leadership 
of the Special Constabulary can be summarised 
as: 
- Providing effective support and
supervision for Special Constables;
- Achieving the effective deployment of
Special Constables, maximising ‘effect’;
- Supporting and ensuring the
development of Specials, including
building initial operational competency,
professional development and career
pathways;
- Ensuring Special Constables feel valued
and appreciated, effective and
worthwhile, championed, empowered,
enjoy good relationships with regular
officers and have high morale;
- Supporting delivery at the front-line of
major changes in the development and
deployment of Specials, to support the
aspirations for future role, as set out in
the section above;
- Supporting development and delivery of
attraction and retention strategies that
build towards and deliver the desired
‘future state’ of the Special
Constabulary.
At a strategic level in forces, the leadership of 
the Special Constabulary needs to be able to 
deliver: 
- A clear vision of future role and model of
operating for their Special Constabulary,
being clear of the nature and scale of
intended contribution to policing;
- An ability to develop a professionalised
Special Constabulary, with the skills and
experience capable of delivering to that
role and operating model;
- An effective deployment of the Special
Constabulary, integrated with the wider
force;
- Setting the conditions, creating the
culture, and achieving the right
leadership to deliver the best possible
experience of being a Special Constable;
- Successful management of the strategic
relationships with others in and beyond
the force, to enable the Special
Constabulary to grow and thrive;
- A ‘voice’ for the Special Constabulary,
and effective projection of its capability,
contribution and potential.
At a national level, the leadership of the Special 
Constabulary needs to deliver on: 
9 
Introduction 
- Establishing a compelling and
coordinated vision for the future role,
capability and operating of the Special
Constabulary;
- Developing a national context in which
the Special Constabulary collectively
grows the required capacity and
capability now and in future;
- Creating the right national conditions,
for example in terms of standards,
culture, and ambition, to support local
forces in creating the best possible
experience of volunteering as a Special
Constable and for forces to maximise
deployment and ‘effect’;
- To relocate the Special Constabulary
strategically, recognising its future
potential to deliver across a wide range
of policing priorities, to contribute to
building organisational capability, and to
reach into all communities promoting
diversity and engagement;
- To achieve the effective strategic
representation, ‘voice’, profile and
integration of the Special Constabulary
at a national level.
Additionally, beyond this leadership 
requirement, leaders in the Special 
Constabulary can also contribute more broadly 
to the strategic and operational development 
and delivery of policing, bringing a wide range of 
skills, experience, fresh perspectives and a 
different culture. 
More broadly, leadership across policing needs 
to achieve a stronger strategic and operational 
alignment and integration. The strategic 
development and contribution of Specials needs 
to be mainstreamed into thinking on key 
aspects of policing reform and development, 
such as future workforce, leadership and 
diversity, as well as across all thematic policing 
portfolios. 
The key leadership challenges 
Looking across the IPSCJ research work, a 
number of areas of leadership challenge in 
respect of the Special Constabulary can be 
identified. This may well not be a wholly 
comprehensive list, but provides a useful point 
of focus in respect of identifying some of the 
key challenges that the leadership of the Special 
Constabulary needs to address. Key challenges 
include: 
- Driving improvement of the experience
of being a Special Constable;
- Reversing decline in capacity and
numbers. Recent years have seen sharp
and sustained reductions in the scale and
capacity of the Special Constabulary. This
has been at a point in time where
arguably the contribution is needed
more than ever, the strategic intent of
most forces has been to achieve growth,
and the potential for a wider and more
specialist contribution are increasingly
understood. Reversing decline and
achieving growth presents a
considerable leadership challenge,
nationally and in local forces;
- Producing and managing a flow of new
recruits into the Special Constabulary, at
a time when current rates of recruitment
are at a historical low. This presents a
challenge in terms of negotiating the
resourcing and prioritisation of Special
Constable recruitment in a context of
competing demands for recruitment, HR
and learning and development resource.
It also requires design and
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implementation of effective attraction 
strategies, and the reduction of negative 
attrition from front-end processes; 
- Attracting and retaining more ‘career’
Special Constables;
- Achieving improved retention and
longevity of volunteering careers in the
Special Constabulary. Current rates of
resignation are above historical trend,
resulting in a young-in-service skewed
Specials cohort nationally and in most
forces;
- Addressing deep-seated problems of
inconsistency and variable standards;
- Achieving a much stronger strategic
profile and positioning of the Special
Constabulary;
- Achieving greater and more consistent
resourcing of the Special Constable
model;
- Achieving better connection between
senior leaders and front-line Specials;
- Delivering enhanced diversity across the
Special Constabulary;
- Delivering a step change in the diversity
of Specials leadership;
- Improving communication of the Special
Constabulary and its role, service and
achievements, both internally within
policing, and externally with the public
and partner agencies.
At a more tactical and operational level, key 
leadership challenges can be summarised as: 
- Achieving greater visibility of leaders,
especially senior leaders;
- Supporting Specials in their
development, and access to training
which can enhance contribution;
- Supporting Specials access to equipment
and other key resources, such as access
to vehicles;
- Improving approaches to reward and
recognition;
- Providing better standards of supervision
and support. In particular, eradicating
situations in which line supervisors are
not accessible and available, or are not
sufficiently skilled and experienced;
- Ensuring appropriate support and access
to services and representation at times
of trauma, complaint, injury and similar
contexts;
- Ensuring the consistent delivery of
models of support for Specials, e.g.
Employer Supported Policing for police
staff who also volunteer as Specials.
Experiences of being led 
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Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the experiences of 
Special Constables of being led, primarily 
drawing on data from the national survey of 
Special Constables undertaken in 2018, and also 
from qualitative research undertaken by the 
IPSCJ in a number of police forces over the past 
three years. The chapter focuses on Special 
Constable experiences of support and 
supervision, and also on the perspectives 
Specials have of the broader leadership model 
and arrangements in their police forces. 
Overall, looking across the findings, it is 
important to emphasise that there is much 
which is good, and strong, in terms of the 
current models of leadership and how they are 
experienced by Specials. Whilst there are key 
areas for consideration and change, the current 
experience of leadership in the Special 
Constabulary is by no means a wholly negative 
picture. There are many contexts and exemplars 
of very high standards of leadership, and of 
Specials feeling very well supported. Therefore, 
future thinking on Special Constabulary 
leadership needs to appreciate and build upon 
these positives, as well as addressing some of 
the areas of required change set out across this 
chapter. 
An unevenness of experiences 
As will be a recurrent theme across this report, 
the experiences of leadership for Specials 
appear to vary widely across England and Wales. 
Overall, when asked if they are satisfied with 
how they are managed as a Special Constable, a 
clear majority of Specials agree that they are 
satisfied. However, a third do not, with one in 
eight strongly disagreeing. This sense of a mixed 
picture is consistently seen across most of the 
data on the experience of being led in the 
Special Constabulary; often showing, as is the 
case here, that for a majority the experience is 
positive, but for a sizeable minority that is not 
the case, and for some it is ‘strongly’ not the 
case. A key aspect pointed to across the data is 
a need for greater consistency, clearer 
standards, and more active and explicit 
understandings and management of 
performance of leaders, to help address the 
problems of those who do not feel satisfied with 
their experience of being managed. 
Responses at police force level to the survey 
should be treated with caution, in particularly 
avoiding reading too much into the positioning 
of responses in individual forces, given that in 
some force contexts response volumes were 
relatively small. However, what the graph below 
does show is that there seems to be a wide 
spread of response patterns in different Special 
Constabularies in terms of the percentage of 
Specials answering that they are satisfied with 
how they are led. The responses range from 
almost 90% to just over 40%. 
13 
Experiences of being led 
Asking Specials to consider leadership more 
generally, beyond their own personal 
experiences of being managed, similarly a 
majority of Specials who responded to the 
national survey answered that they agreed their 
force was good at managing volunteers, and 
that their Special Constabularies were well led. 
Once again, looking at the spread of responses 
at force level, caution is needed not to read too 
much into individual forces, given that some 
forces had relatively small response volumes. 
Nevertheless, that caution in respect of the data 
notwithstanding, it is clear that there is a very 
wide range of response patterns across different 
forces in terms of whether Specials feel that 
their Special Constabulary is well led. 
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Asking a similar, but slightly differently focused 
question, in respect of whether Specials felt that 
the leadership/rank arrangements worked well 
in their force, a broadly similar pattern of 
responses is again evident. A majority answered 
positively, but a sizeable minority 
(approximately a third) disagreed that 
arrangements worked well. Again, one in eight 
Specials ‘strongly disagreed’ that 
rank/leadership arrangements work well. 
Again, with the caveat that care should be taken 
in reading too much into individual force results 
given response levels in individual forces, it can 
be seen that there is a large degree of variation 
in response between different forces. (The two 
forces of Sussex and Northumbria who do not 
have rank arrangements have been removed 
from this graph). 
Supervision and support 
On the whole, Specials responded positively to 
the level of support and supervision that they 
have received. Three quarters felt they received 
an appropriate level of support, and 18% 
strongly agreed. However, alongside that, 
almost a quarter disagreed. 
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A majority of Specials were also satisfied with 
the feedback they receive, although again there 
is a challenge in that over a third do not, with 
one in eight ‘strongly’ disagreeing. 
Where there was dissatisfaction with 
supervision and support, one range of concerns 
related to the experience and skills of 
supervisors, primarily reflecting feelings that 
those in supervisory roles lacked experience. 
This seems to match up with challenges of 
recruitment into promoted roles, particularly 
S/Sergeant, which has led in some contexts to 
appointment into S/Sergeant roles very early in 
service, and in some forces before Specials have 
attained independent patrol status. 
Most commonly, concerns relate more to a 
simple absence of supervisor engagement and 
contact. Including some Specials who have had 
little if any contact with their supervisors. 
“Never met her. And I’d never met the him 
who came before the her either!” (Special 
Constable)
“Supervision? I don’t know who mine is.” 
(Special Constable)
This sense of gaps in supervision and support, 
through an absence or lack of accessibility of 
supervisory ranks in the Specials, does not seem 
to occur in all forces, but nevertheless appears 
from our research across forces to be a quite 
widespread concern. It seems to have its roots 
in a number of different problems: 
- Problems in some forces in recruiting to
and resourcing front-line supervisory
ranks in the Specials. This can in turn
lead to a number of issues, including
some supervisors who are very
inexperienced, some who may have
been unenthusiastic in taking on the
role, a lack of stability in rank structures
including a high proportion of ‘Acting’
supervisory roles, and too large spans of
control due to unfilled roles;
- The above problems can be exacerbated
in force contexts which have a higher
proportion of non-independent, young-
in-service, Specials, who are much more
demanding of supervisor time and
resources;
- A lack of standards, role description
induction, training and support for those
in supervisory roles;
- Little or no structured management of
supervisors, meaning that gaps in
contribution or capability are not
systematically identified;
- Related to the above point, a lack of
structured feedback opportunities,
meaning that gaps and problems are not
identified and resolved.
With more established, and longer-in-service 
Specials, such gaps in supervisor engagement 
and contact may well matter less to individual 
Specials, although in such contexts they can lead 
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to a sense of lack of progression, appreciation, 
communication and support. However, for 
younger-in-service Specials, such gaps in 
supervisory support may well be the difference 
between staying and resigning, and progressing 
towards independent patrol status or not doing 
so.  
Effectiveness of deployment and 
utilisation 
Research shows that a critical element that 
drives overall morale and experience for 
Specials is the degree to which they are 
effectively and meaningfully tasked and 
deployed. It is important that tasks undertaken 
feel worthwhile, value-adding, interesting and 
enjoyable, all of which reduce likelihood of 
disengagement and resignation. 
Most Specials agree that they are tasked 
effectively, although a one-fifth of Specials 
disagree. 
A majority of Specials feel that some of the time 
that they volunteer as a Special is wasted, with 
almost one in five ‘strongly’ agreeing that this is 
the case. 
Looking across forces, the proportion of Specials 
who feel that some of their time is wasted 
varies markedly across forces. Once again, 
caution should be taken in focusing on 
individual force positions in the graph, due to 
relatively low response volumes in some forces. 
However, the scale of variation nationally is 
marked. 
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Views are mixed amongst Specials as to whether 
their force uses the Specials it has to their full 
potential. Broadly half agree it does, but also 
almost half do not. 
Once again, looking at response patterns across 
police forces, there is a large degree of 
variation. 
This data across effectiveness of deployment 
and tasking presents some direct and important 
leadership challenges. In summary, a fifth of 
Specials disagree that they are tasked 
effectively, almost two thirds feel that some of 
their time is wasted, and almost half of Specials 
disagree that their force is using the Specials it 
has to their full potential.  
This points to key challenges for forces and for 
their Special Constabulary leaders, in terms of: 
- Whether the force has a strategy for the
effective and prioritised deployment of
Specials, or if this is primarily left to ad
hoc arrangements within individual
teams and with individual accompanying
regular officers;
- Whether the force understands its
current deployment and ‘effect’ of
Specials;
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- Whether the force has plans to build
better deployment methodologies for its
Special Constables in the future.
Clearly, the question of effective utilisation goes 
beyond methods of tasking and deployment, 
and also embraces broader strategic challenges, 
including: 
- How to make best use of the skills and
experience Specials have, often brought
in from outside of the police service;
- How to best develop the policing skills of
Specials, to enhance contribution;
- How to develop the contribution of
Specials in a broader range of areas of
policing.
Poor induction and initial support 
A key gap consistently and strongly identified by 
Specials in their experience of being led is an 
absence of structured support at the induction 
and initial practice stage. There is felt to be a 
gap after initial training, with (in many forces) 
what comes next in terms of practice induction 
and competency build being experienced by 
many Specials as being poorly supported and 
organised. 
“I know talking to some people off my 
course, you know, they’ve gone out for 
the first time and then they were like, 
whoa, you know, straight into a violent 
domestic.  And to me that’s letting the 
officer down, it’s not backing them up, 
you know, coming again from the military 
perspective, you don't go into battle or
into a situation, yeah, unless you can, you 
know, deal with it.” (Special Constable)
“When I first joined I thought I had some 
really good training and then you’re like 
oh yeah this is great.  Then like you’re 
assigned to that station and it just stops… 
So there is no introduction, there is no, 
okay well who am I going to go and talk to, 
where am I, what duties am I doing, it was 
kind of left up to me to kind of wander 
around.” (Special Constable)
“I think it should have been easier… I felt I 
did a lot of work… it might have been 
useful if I’d got introduced to a few more 
people rather than having to do it myself.  
Because I would say the more shy among 
the Specials may not have done it.” 
(Special Constable)
For many Specials, they feel that they have 
‘been left alone to get on with it’, in terms of 
induction and orientation to the front-line 
environment, and then in terms of developing 
capability and signing off competencies. For 
others, there is also a (potentially opposite) 
experience of feeling ‘pressured’ in respect of 
their pace in progressing competency sign off. 
Visibility and connection 
A priority of many Specials for their leaders is 
that leadership is ‘visible’ to them, and that 
their leaders are ‘connected’ to them. 
Experiences vary widely, with some feeling their 
leaders are remote and lack visibility, and some 
the opposite. 
“Very low visibility of the senior people. 
Never see any of them.” (Special 
Constable)
“And some of the people I’ve met who 
have been in senior management have 
been very visible, they are fantastic.  So I 
would say there’s a lot more positives 
there than negatives” (Special Constable)
For many Specials, they contrasted the visibility 
of Special Constabulary leaders positively with 
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what they perceived as the visibility of regular 
senior officers. 
“We see our senior officers out all the 
time, and they do get to know their front-
line Specials. Very different to the regs, 
never set eyes on any of their top brass 
on a Friday night, probably never will. Our 
leaders aren’t 9-5 in the same way that 
their chiefs are.” (Special Constable)
Qualities including being seen as ‘genuine’, 
‘authentic’ and ‘passionate’ about what they do 
are valued by Specials. 
“You’ve got people like [name], you know, 
who really genuinely does have a passion 
and that does come across quite 
profoundly, you know, he talks and you 
realise he does actually mean what he’s 
saying, you know.  And again it’s having 
that kind of mind set really throughout the 
whole organisation and trying to get that 
bedded into Specials, that passion and 
that proactive initiative.” (Special 
Constable)
A quite common perspective is for Specials to 
have some appreciation that good work is being 
undertaken by Special leaders, but feeling that 
the communication of their work and role is 
poor. 
“From what I see they [senior leaders in 
the Special Constabulary] work very hard 
and do a lot for us. But I don’t think most 
[Specials] see any of that, and the 
communication is rubbish.” (Special 
Constable)
In some force contexts, there are problems of 
what is experienced as a lack of ‘connection’ 
between Specials and their senior leaders. In 
part this relates to feelings that senior Specials 
are out of touch or not up to date. In part, to a 
sense of senior leaders not being present and 
leading by example. In part, to gaps in 
knowledge as to what senior leaders do (senior 
leadership being ‘in parallel’ and poorly 
understood by front-line Specials). And in part, 
issues of ‘difference’; for example, senior 
Specials are often older, have a longer record of 
service, and are at different life stages 
professionally and personally, to many of the 
younger, and younger-in-service, Specials that 
they command. 
In some force contexts, there were perceptions 
of ‘agendas’, ‘politics’ and ‘territory’ at a senior 
level, which again made Specials on the ground 
feel frustrated with and disconnected from their 
senior leaders. This was particularly the case in 
forces where Specials perceived that senior 
Specials did not get on with, or work well with, 
their senior colleagues. 
For some Specials, aspects of senior Specials 
demeanour, style and uniform tended to add to 
a sense of disconnect. This was often associated 
with views that ‘there are too many’ senior 
officers, and fundamental gaps in knowledge 
about what senior Specials do. As one Special 
put it, the ‘lots of braid’ problem leads to a 
presentation of senior Specials that tends to set 
them apart and distance them from front-line 
focused Specials. 
“And sat at the front there was this row of 
older white guys in suits, never seen any 
of them before, never seen them out, don’t 
know who they are or what they do.” 
(Special Constable)
“I do sometimes wonder what it actually 
achieves by having the hierarchy that we 
have. In very simple terms, I just don’t 
know what they do. I do know there seems 
to be a lot of them, lots of layers of them.” 
(Special Constable)
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These findings point to a challenge, in particular 
for senior Special leaders, or remaining ‘in 
touch’, connected, communicative and relevant 
to front-line Specials. The picture varies from 
force to force, but many senior Specials are 
effective in achieving front-line presence and 
visibility, perhaps comparing favourably with 
many of their senior regular counterparts. 
Looking at best practice nationally, key aspects 
that senior Specials could usefully focus upon 
include: 
- More effective communication across
the Special Constabulary about their
activity and role, which is often poorly
understood;
- A greater involvement of Specials as a
whole in terms of key decisions for the
Special Constabulary and processes of
forming strategy for the future;
- Enhancing visibility of instances where
senior Specials are championing the
Special Constabulary, or progressing
issues of particular front-line resonance
and concern (e.g. equipment, training,
driving, etc.).
The challenges of Special Sergeant 
roles 
The majority of Specials tend to prioritise front-
line visible leadership. Much of this front-line 
leadership relates to the S/Sergeant role, which 
is also by far the largest rank numerically in the 
Special Constabulary, with the 1,026 
S/Sergeants nationally amounting to 62% of all 
promoted Specials. 
As is the case with all aspects of Specials 
leadership, there is a widely varying picture 
nationally around how S/Sergeant roles operate, 
and in issues around their recruitment, support 
and management. 
S/Sergeants can find themselves in some force 
contexts overwhelmed by numbers of Specials 
to supervise and in particular with the extent of 
developmental support and capability 
assessment activity in forces where the cohort 
of Specials is weighted more towards young-in-
service Special Constables. Many S/Sergeants 
reflect on the scale of administrative burden at 
their rank; often perceived to be exacerbated by 
a complex and bureaucratic discipline system, 
and by the lack of coordination and HR support 
in some force contexts for front-line Specials 
supervisors.  
“I think we need to be taking away the 
administrative burden and getting people 
out onto the street to actually lead on the 
ground and to actually do what we all 
signed up to do, which is to serve the 
public.” (Special Constable)
“What we’re saying is that we need more 
centralised support on managing 
Specials, on dealing with those who don’t 
show up or cause problems.” (Special 
Constable)
For some Specials, they perceive the problem 
also in part to be that a proportion of other 
leaders in their Special Constabularies are no 
longer front-line active or particularly directly 
engaged in front-line supervision and support; 
this perceived dissociation of some Specials 
leaders, particularly at higher ranks, with the 
actual policing activity of the Special 
Constabulary, is seen as having a funnelling 
effect of those front-line supervisory 
responsibilities falling on fewer individuals, 
particularly at S/Sergeant level. 
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“Lots of parallels with the regulars, so it’s 
the sergeant role where all the pressure is 
at.” (Special Constable)
As a consequence of the above picture, many 
S/Sergeants find their activity skewed towards 
spending time dealing with non-attendance, 
poor performance, and with the competency 
processes of new Specials. This leaves 
problematically little time to more generally 
supervise, support and operationally lead the 
rest of their (attending and performing) team 
members, and sometimes with insufficient time 
to engage themselves in front-line practice as 
much as they would wish. 
“And then by them concentrating on the 
20% doing wrong, then, rather than the 
80% who are doing right, it becomes 
imbalanced and then therefore you get 
demotivated good people, those career 
Specials go, you get retention problems.”
(Special Constable)
Many forces are having difficulty in recruiting to 
S/Sergeant roles, many are under-establishment 
and have high proportions of acting roles. These 
problems are often driven by the skew in profile 
towards younger-in-service Specials, which 
reduces the size of the ‘pool’ from which to 
recruit.  
“We’re definitely short, we’re short of 
Special Sergeants and we haven’t got a 
big pool to draw them from at the 
moment.” (Special Constable)
Whilst there remains a flow of applicants for 
S/Sergeant roles in all forces, and the problem 
should not be over-exaggerated, some Specials 
at Constable rank are ‘put off’ by the prospect 
of promotion. Many Specials perceive becoming 
a S/Sergeant as something that consumes a 
great deal of time, carries a lot of responsibility 
and expectation, does not feel particularly 
appreciated or rewarded, and would divert 
them from what they enjoy most and find most 
rewarding, which is front-line policing. 
“I have no idea why anyone would want to 
become a Sergeant. It consumes your 
whole life, if you try to do it properly. I 
know people who work every evening, 
literally every day.” (Special Constable)
“I’ve seen the role destroy good people.
Then they leave, because they just can’t 
cope anymore. It’ a scandal really. A real 
shame.” (Special Constable)
There is no systematic data set of the longevity 
and retention in role of S/Sergeants. However, 
qualitative research in forces suggests that 
there is quite a flow of S/Sergeants either 
leaving, or returning to Special Constable rank. 
Issues raised tend to reflect the role placing 
considerable burdens on time, and takes much 
time away from front-line practice. 
These findings point to two things; firstly, the 
need to better design and manage S/Sergeant 
roles, and to better support Specials within 
them. This needs a more robust and systematic 
approach to understanding span of control, and 
to ensure a role design that makes such roles 
manageable in terms of balancing the 
volunteering experience with the rest of life.  
Secondly, more broadly (and providing the 
strategic context for the role design and 
organisational design work discussed above), 
there is a need for a different vision of what 
such front-line supervision should be, in terms 
of its character, its emphasis, and its style of 
operating. In terms of that strategic thinking, 
Specials consistently request front-line 
supervisors who: 
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- prioritise front-line practice, are seen as
highly credible police officers, and are
seen first and foremost as front-line
practice leaders, bringing a passion for
and expertise in policing;
- are freed up from ‘tick box’ competency
assessments to be able to lead on
rounded capability assessment, based on
real-time observation in the field and not
the collection and signing off of lists of
criteria;
- are able to engage and lead all their
team members, and are not just
preoccupied with issues of failure to
attend and perform;
- care for their officers, seek to know
them as individuals, understand their
motivations and aspirations, and who ‘go
the extra mile’ and ‘have their backs’.
What Specials would like to see less of is: 
- Remote management by email;
- A focus on paperwork and metrics,
rather than people and practice;
- Jobs-worth approaches;
- Leaders who are not prepared to be
there and stand up for their people;
- Leaders who are never visible doing the
job.
Doubts over senior leader influence 
Whilst senior leaders (as discussed in later 
chapters) place a great deal of emphasis on 
their roles in influencing on behalf of the Special 
Constabulary and developing effective strategic 
relationships, there is a caucus of scepticism 
amongst Specials of Constable rank that such 
influencing is effective. 
Some Specials perceive their senior leaders to 
carry little weight, credibility and influence, and 
are not listened to. 
“Our chief and SMT could give so much 
but I don’t think they’re listened to or 
respected very much. Probably exactly as 
much as we are at the front line.” (Special 
Constable)
This is reflected in perceptions as to whether 
the ‘voice of Specials’ is heard effectively in 
shaping thinking within their force about the 
future of the Special Constabulary. Over four in 
ten Specials think that it is not. Only 7% 
‘strongly’ agree that it is. 
For some Specials, this feeds into and links with 
more negative views about the capability and 
efficacy of senior roles and those who occupy 
them more broadly. However, for others, 
Specials feel frustrated that their senior leaders 
are capable, and have a lot to contribute at 
senior level, but that their force does not seem 
to create the environment and have the culture 
where this potential is realised. 
“As I see it, our leaders are often much 
more experienced at managing big 
companies, big budgets, big numbers of 
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people, than their [regular] police 
equivalents. They have that critical 
professional managerial background other 
senior police lack. If the police was a 
business, it would have gone broke 
decades ago. In that sense, I think 
Specials leaders raise the standards of 
police leadership, not lowers them”
(Special Constable)
Standards 
There are very mixed perspectives amongst 
Specials in terms of the quality of their leaders, 
and the standards that are set and managed 
across Specials leadership. For many, these are 
felt to be a lack of framework, expectations and 
clarity of role. 
“There needs to be better accountability in 
terms of what the supervisor does, how 
they’re expected to perform and also what 
the expectations are in terms of behaviour 
and standards.” (Special Constable)
This context is seen by some as leading to a 
variation in standards and motivation of Specials 
leaders, which can risk having an undermining 
effect on Specials leadership more generally. 
“I see some who literally just ride it and 
they love having the rank but they don’t 
do anything. You know, have the rank but 
they haven’t done operational duties and 
they love turning out to the county show 
or the carnivals wearing all their clean kit 
and extra braidery, whatever, don’t get me 
wrong there’s some who are really good, 
there’s some who are not. I’m not tarring 
everybody with the same brush.” (Special 
Constable)
The issue of standards and expectation also 
loops back to the discussion above in respect of 
the challenges of recruitment, particularly into 
S/Sergeant roles, and the sense that such 
challenges can lead to the recruitment of very 
much less qualified and experienced colleagues. 
“You’ve got people going into the roles 
who’ve literally just got five minutes of 
service because they’ve been there five 
minutes, you know, you’re talking to an 
old timer here, and they’ve been there five 
minutes and made supervisor or Sergeant 
and you’re thinking, you don’t have the 
credentials, you don’t have the reputation 
or the rapport or the respect and then 
you’re devaluing that role because it’s 
almost dished out because they’ve got to 
have one.” (Special Constable)
“So we’ve got three…  I’m a temporary 
Sergeant now, so we’ve got two other 
Sergeants, one for each station, and then 
Inspector.  And I think all of us are still in 
probation period effectively.  So yeah, that 
role of helping the new ones coming in 
and helping with their PDP is sort of 
coming down to us who don’t really know 
what the hell we’re doing anyway.” 
(Temporary Special Sergeant)
Alongside such issues, there are also concerns 
relating to: 
- Poor standards of assessment and
selection at the recruitment stage;
- A perceived lack of induction and
training for supervisors, not all of whom
bring any people leadership background
or skillset;
- Very little structured supervision or
appraisal of supervisors;
- Few opportunities to feedback on the
experience of being supervised;
- A lack of clarity as to what the role of
supervisor should involve.
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Style 
Leadership styles and approaches across forces 
vary considerably. 
There are behaviours amongst some senior 
leadership teams which are less engaging, 
empowering and appreciative, and instead tend 
to reflect approaches that are more didactic and 
hierarchical in style. 
“With like the higher up, higher above 
ranks being quite dictatorial, I suppose.” 
(Special Constable)
“Sometimes it does seem to be a bit 
about empires, my patch their patch, my 
Specials and their Specials. We’re meant 
to be one force, one Special Constabulary, 
but over the years, time and time again, I
have seen lots of behaviours that do not 
reflect that, mainly from Specials 
themselves rather than the Regulars, and 
from people who have quite senior ranks.” 
(Special Constable)
For some Specials, they feel that there are more 
deeply-set cultural aspects of such issues of 
style which need addressing. 
“There always seems to be more of a 
problem with Specials’ ranks rather than 
actual Regulars or Regular ranks.  I don’t 
know why. There must be some kind of 
power trip or something, who knows?” 
(Special Constable)
As reflected above in terms of front-line 
supervisors, Specials look for certain traits and 
styles in their leaders. They can be very 
frustrated when the operating styles of leaders 
falls short of, or is very different to, those 
desired traits.  
“‘Because he’s just like, “Yeah, you need 
to do your PDPs.” It’s the same story 
every time. There’s just no talk of 
achievement.  It’s not like, “Right, brilliant.  
What’s been happening now? What’s 
happened over the last month? Can we 
like get enthused about this whole thing?” 
One of my colleagues said when we came 
out of the meeting the last time, “do you 
find when you come out of these meetings 
that you just wanna go and die?” Like it’s 
all just so boring. I think, yeah, I think it 
can be changed to make people’s 
attitudes a little bit better…“Amazing you 
saved this guy from throwing himself off 
the Docks.” Which someone did and 
actually not much was kind of put towards 
that in terms of actual achievements and 
kind of celebrating that success.” (Special 
Constable)
“The best ones lead from the front, 
wearing their love of policing on their 
sleeve and putting their people first. The 
job first, rank second. Then there’s the 
process pedants, who’ve never managed 
to be in charge of shit all else their whole 
lives, and now they’ve got this train set to 
play with, to be the fat controller.” (Special 
Constable)
These findings point to the need to consider 
issues of style and ways of operating of leaders, 
at all ranks. Some programmes of training for 
Specials leaders, where it is available, tend to 
foreground issues of technical knowledge and 
expertise, without actively engaging with wider 
questions of leadership identity, style and 
projection.  
Perspectives of Special 
supervisors 
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Introduction 
This chapter of the report explores the 
experiences of Special Constables in leadership 
roles. The chapter primarily draws from data in 
the 2018 national survey of Special Constables, 
which had questions specifically for Specials 
leaders, and also from qualitative research 
interviews and focus groups undertaken by the 
IPSCJ in a number of forces between 2016 and 
2019. 
The focus is not primarily on Special Chief 
Officers, as there is a later chapter devoted to 
their experiences. This chapter is mostly focused 
on those in other promoted ranks within the 
Special Constabulary. 
Overall, Specials leaders have found being in 
their promoted role a positive experience. There 
is an argument that the survey may exaggerate 
that picture, in the sense that those questioned 
were individuals still in a promoted role, and for 
those who have not found it a good experience 
they are more likely to have left. Nevertheless, 
virtually all those promoted Specials responding 
to the survey said it had been a good 
experience, with a third strongly agreeing.  
Consistent with that picture, a large majority of 
Specials in promoted roles would recommend 
seeking promotion to other Special Constables. 
Attraction to the role 
Many forces experience some challenges in 
attracting Specials to take on leadership roles, 
particularly the initial step to S/Sergeant. 
Primary factors discussed by Specials are: 
- Work-life balance, and perceptions that
Special leadership roles require a lot of
hours of service to fulfil;
- Worries about not being able to
undertake as much front-line policing
due to time being taken up by
supervisory duties and meetings;
- Feeling that they experience enough
‘paperwork’ and ‘line management’ in
their day jobs.
“One of the challenges I sense is if you 
become a Special Sergeant, you can, you 
know as you say the role is administrative, 
you can end up doing a lot of the 
administrative people management and
less and less of the policing.” (Special 
Constable)
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In some forces, particularly where recent 
recruitment volumes have been relatively high, 
there is a significant pinch-point in the Specials 
supervisory model in respect of S/Sergeants. 
This is created by three intertwined factors: a 
young-in-service cohort provides fewer suitably 
qualified candidates for S/Sergeant roles; a 
young-in-service cohort creates a greater 
demand for the work of S/Sergeants; and that 
greater demand tends to skew S/Sergeant roles 
to support, supervision and assessment of new 
non-independent Specials, which can make the 
role less appealing to some. 
“With so many trainees, the people to 
promote just ain’t there and those that are, 
none of them wants to be a supervisor, 
they’re quite happy doing what they’re 
doing, working on response, doing 
neighbourhood work, whatever they get 
involved with and it’s not good 
pressurising people to do it because more 
often than not, they don’t work out. So 
yes, we definitely are short of supervisors. 
But not everyone wants to take on the 
responsibilities that the force expects 
them to.” (Special Superintendent)
Sitting alongside the generally positive 
experiences reflected by those in supervisory 
roles, for those not in them, they are often seen 
as unattractive. This contradiction may reflect, 
to some degree, limited understandings of what 
is involved. 
“The management side is a lot of 
responsibility and very little reward or 
recognition for it.” (Special Constable)
Appointment to role 
Forces vary widely in the degree of, and quality 
of, processes relating to promotion, clarity of 
role design and of expectation. 
Many forces present some very basic gaps in 
terms of role design and communication of 
expectation. 
“If there was any clarity what they’re 
looking for in a special sergeant, 
inspector, superintendent, then the force 
would do a lot better in finding the right 
people to fill those roles.” (Special 
Sergeant)
The national surveys show a majority of 
promoted Specials have a role description which 
reflects the role that they are in; albeit one in 
five disagreed that was the case. 
The national survey responses also suggest most 
promoted Specials feel that the process of their 
appointment to role was ‘open and fair’; albeit 
one in eight do not. 
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Nevertheless, in some forces, there remain 
concerns from some Specials as to what they 
perceive as poorly managed and biased 
appointment processes.  
“Who you know, who is friends with who. 
It’s very unprofessional in my opinion.” 
(Special Sergeant)
In many more force settings, there are 
reflections that whilst processes have improved, 
there has been a history of appointments that 
have been less professionally managed. 
“It’s a lot more professional now but in the 
past it was almost like, you know, who 
wants the job now kind of thing.” (Special 
Chief Inspector)
A key challenge – again not by any means in all 
force contexts, but certainly in a number – is a 
failure to effectively induct and communicate 
new supervisors as to the nature and 
expectations of their promoted role. 
“Sometimes it feels like it’s, hey you’re 
promoted now, good luck. You’re a 
Sergeant now, you’re an Inspector now, 
I’m not gonna tell you what that’s about 
but sure you’ll work it out quick enough.” 
(Special Inspector)
Statistically, the national survey suggests most 
supervisors feel that their role was well 
explained to them before being promoted. 
However, almost one in five promoted Specials 
disagree that this was the case. 
Management and support in the 
role 
The picture seems highly variable as to the 
support available to Specials supervisors. At 
best, there appear to be models of structured 
induction, managed probationary period with 
competency sign off, systematic appraisal, and 
clear specification for competencies. At the 
other end of the spectrum, none of those 
aspects are in place.   
Development of leaders 
In respect of training and development for 
Specials leaders, several senior Specials felt that 
the key question was more one of recognising 
and building on existing skills and experience. 
“For many of our leaders, it isn’t about 
developing new skills and experience, we 
already bring all that. It is about 
recognition, and making good use, of the 
enormous skill sets we bring into 
policing.” (Special Chief Inspector)
For some, there is recognition that capturing 
and understanding skills is challenging in itself, 
as well as seeing cultural barriers to doing so in 
policing, particularly where such skills have been 
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gained and accredited outside of the police 
force. 
“We’re not good enough at that.  And 
we’re also not good enough at 
recognising day job skills.  But it’s a 
difficult area to cover because it’s such a 
wide ranging set of skills. As well as it not 
being in the police culture, policing 
doesn’t do skills that have not been grown 
and signed off within the force.” (Special 
Chief Officer)
For some, there is a frustration that they feel 
policing always looks towards the Specials in 
terms of perceived deficits and inferiority to 
regulars; whereas, in their view, promoted 
Specials often have supervisory and leadership 
skills and experience far beyond their regular 
supervisory colleagues. 
“The gulf in class between my Special 
Sergeants and their regular Sergeant 
counterparts, honestly, enormous. Most of 
my [Special] Sergeants have years of 
experience of managing people. Many of 
the regs supervision are two years in and 
have no people management experience 
or life experience at all” (Special Chief 
Inspector)
Having said that, many Specials perceive deficits 
in the training and development provided by 
forces to Specials leaders. 
Whilst a majority of Specials leaders feel they 
have received from their force the training they 
need, slightly over a third do not. This would 
appear to represent a significant strategic gap in 
training and development provision. One in ten 
promoted Specials ‘strongly disagree’ that they 
have received the training that they need to 
undertake their role.  
This strategic gap in training and development 
support is echoed in the qualitative research 
interviews with Specials leaders. 
“So the current training [for Special 
Constabulary leaders] is minimal. The first 
line Supervisor training is pants in [their 
force] certainly. In some Forces it is 
better. A very uneven picture.” (Special 
Chief Officer)
Ambition for future promotion 
A majority of Specials are either unsure, or say 
that they do not wish to seek further 
promotion. There are many reasons why 
Specials may not wish to seek further 
promotion, many of which are neither negative 
or indicative of a problem for Special 
Constabularies. Nevertheless, such figures for 
aspirations of further promotion do present 
some strategic challenges to achieving effective 
succession of future senior leaders. 
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A slight majority of promoted Specials 
interested in further promotion feel either 
unsure or negative about receiving support for 
their future aspirations of being promoted. 
Whilst this should not be exaggerated as a 
problem, and half of Specials do feel they would 
be supported, it points to a potential strategic 
gap in support for leadership pathways and 
careers in the Special Constabulary. 
Relationships with Regular officers 
and supervisors 
The responses to the national survey suggest 
that most Special leaders feel regular officers 
are supportive of them in their role; albeit one 
in five Special leaders disagree. 
Best practice reflects: 
- Clarity of role for regular supervision and
Specials supervision, written down,
understood and agreed;
- Culture amongst regular officers and
regular supervisors which is supportive
and appreciative of Specials supervisors;
- Opportunities for regular and Special
supervision to work together, e.g. on
operations or projects;
- Integrated leadership teams, enabling
and encouraging of Special leaders
contribution;
- Empowerment of Specials leaders to
lead on aspects of force policy or
practice, at all levels in the organisation;
- Opportunities to train together;
- Opportunities for coaching and
mentoring (in both directions, so regular
supervisors coaching/mentoring, and
vice versa).
At the other end of the spectrum, poor practice 
tends to reflect: 
- Cultures which do not engage with
Specials leaders more broadly within
management teams;
- Regular cultures which emphasise that
Special Constabulary leaders carry no
formal authority, formal rank, status or
significance in the wider leadership of
the force;
- Lack of clarity over roles;
- A tendency for Special and regular
supervision to sit separately, lack
communication, and criticise one
another for gaps in the overall
supervisory model for Specials.
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Regular leaders have a strong role to play in 
‘setting the tone’ for how relationships between 
regular and Specials leaders play out.  
The style of engagement of Specials leaders can 
also be a critical factor in the success of 
relationships.  
The demanding nature of 
supervisory roles and time 
pressures 
A major challenge for promoted Specials is the 
time demand of the role. 
Over a quarter of Specials leaders ‘strongly 
agree’ that their current role is very demanding 
of their time. 
“I know Inspectors who have younger 
children and there’s a hell of a lot for them 
to do, I know they send emails late into
the night because that’s the only free 
moment, that’s when they’ve dealt with 
the kids.” (Special Sergeant)
“There are two choices. This is your life 
and it dominates over everything else in 
your life. Or you haven’t got time to do it. 
In my opinion, that’s down to poor role 
design, an absence of clear expectations, 
no supervision. No experience of 
managing volunteers well for the force. 
It’s a real shame, because for most people 
in the end they can’t put in everything of 
themselves forever, and they burn out, 
they move on, and we lose some 
incredible people.” (Special Inspector)
Perhaps reinforcing one of the barriers 
(identified earlier) to attraction into leadership 
roles, a majority of Specials leaders say that the 
other requirements of their role make it difficult 
for them to perform front-line duties as much as 
they would like to. 
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Feelings of limited ‘voice’ and 
influence 
Given their positions in leadership roles within 
the Special Constabulary, it is perhaps a 
surprising finding of the national survey that 
almost half of Specials leaders do not feel that 
they can influence the future of the Special 
Constabulary. One in seven ‘strongly disagrees’ 
that they can influence. 
Perhaps less surprising, but still strategically 
challenging, a majority of Specials leaders do 
not feel that they can influence the future 
direction of the service. 
Linking to some degree with those two findings, 
well over a third of Special leaders disagree that 
their ideas are listened to. Taken collectively, 
this suggests that Specials leaders feel that they 
have limited ‘voice’ and influence; that they are 
in a leadership role, but that their leadership is 
not ‘real’ in the sense of being able to lead or 
shape change – not only within the wider 
service, but also within the Special Constabulary 
itself. 
For some Special leaders, this picture goes 
beyond a feeling of not being listened to, 
towards a broader and deeper culture of being 
actively resisted in terms of exercising a 
leadership role.  
“Ended up starting my own Anti-Social 
Behaviour unit, way before anti-social 
behaviour was something on the agenda 
for government. Had fantastic successes. 
Got stopped because we were too 
successful.” (Special Chief Officer)
“I call these people ‘dementors’.  If you 
watch Harry Potter there is this black 
entity called a dementor and it sucks all 
the life blood and energy out of you.  By 
standing near them… I met quite a few of 
those people. In fact, every police force 
has them.  They sometimes hide in the 
shadows but you know when you are near 
one because you feel that you are hated 
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as a Special or volunteer.” (Special Chief 
Officer)
Perceptions of the dynamics of the 
Special Constabulary leadership 
team 
Looking across the national survey responses, a 
majority of Specials leaders agree that their 
leadership team works well together. However, 
a third of Specials leaders do not; and a 
concerning one-sixth of Special leaders ‘strongly 
disagree’ that they are in a team which works 
well together. 
Where Special leaders are not felt to work well 
as a team, often there is a perceived ‘gap’ or 
‘distance’ between more senior ranked Specials, 
and those in front-line supervisory roles. Other 
characteristics of such teams include a lack of 
opportunities to meet, poorly managed 
meetings, and a lack of engagement and 
opportunities to contribute and to shape 
strategy and direction. Such contexts also often 
have dynamics relating to personalities, in 
particular a perception that individuals at senior 
level are ‘blockers’ to change.  
Where teams are more successful, cohesive and 
positive, they are characterised by: 
- Opportunities to engage and contribute
at all ranks across the team;
- Linked to that, plenty of opportunities to
lead, operationally, developmentally,
and strategically, with a delegated and
enabling style of leadership;
- Effective meeting structures, coupled
with effective communications more
broadly;
- Senior Special leaders who are
interested in, and in touch with, the
front-line.
Team dynamics present a particular challenge at 
times in respect of diversity and difference. The 
majority of Specials leadership teams are 
primarily, and in some cases exclusively at 
senior level, male and white.  
Leadership models and 
structures 
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Introduction 
Ranks and leadership roles held by volunteer 
Specials within Special Constabularies have a 
long history. A recent survey of police forces 
identified that there were 1,668 Specials at the 
rank of Special Sergeant or above, meaning that 
14.7% of Specials are in a promoted rank. That 
proportion is up from an estimated 12.0% 
(estimated from incomplete data, which was 
missing seven forces) in 2016. 
This chapter summarises current models and 
structures for rank arrangements in all 44 
(including BTP) Special Constabularies across 
England and Wales. The chapter then discusses 
the function of ranks, engages with current 
debates about ‘equivalency’ with regular ranks, 
discusses the effectiveness of the 
implementation and management of rank 
arrangements, and identifies challenges in 
respect of diversity and gender. 
Overall, as set out across this chapter, what is 
striking about the current picture of rank 
arrangements in the Special Constabulary is: 
- The range and variability of different
rank models;
- Lack of national guidance and steer,
coupled with a lack of consensus about
the future direction that rank
arrangements should take;
- Serious challenges in respect of
problems in effectively managing and
executing rank arrangements, and in
terms of the diversity of those in
promoted roles.
Special Constabulary rank 
structures across forces 
42 of the 44 Special Constabularies across 
England and Wales currently have rank 
arrangements, the exceptions being Sussex and 
Northumbria. Of those, 41 use rank titles 
consistent with those used in the regular service 
(Special Sergeant, Special Inspector, etc.), the 
exception being West Yorkshire which maintains 
a ‘Section Officer’ and ‘Senior Section Officer’ 
nomenclature. 
The numbers at each rank are summarised in 
the table below. 
Rank Number % of all Specials 
S/Constable 9,674 85.3 
S/Sergeant 1,026 9.0 
S/Inspector 455 4.0 
S/Chief Inspector 101 0.9 
S/Supt 40 0.4 
S/Chief Supt 1 0.0 
Asst. or Deputy Chief 14 0.1 
Special Chief Officer 31 0.3 
In terms of supervisory ratios, in the above 
figures there is one S/Sergeant for every 9.4 
S/Constable ranked officers. There is one 
S/Inspector for every 2.3 S/Sergeant. There are 
86 Specials ranked at S/Superintendent or 
above, amounting to 0.8% of all Specials. 
Caution should be taken in comparing such 
ratios, and the related sense of ‘spans of 
control’, between the regular service and 
Specials. For a host of reasons, the comparison 
is of two quite different contexts. Nevertheless, 
for interest and some context, comparative 
figures are summarised in the table below. 
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Regulars Specials 
Number of Constables 
per Sergeant 
5.2 9.4 
Number of Sergeants 
per Inspector 
3.3 2.3 
Percentage in promoted 
role 
22.1% 14.7% 
Percentage at rank of 
Superintendent or 
above 
1.1% 0.8% 
There is significant variation in the models and 
scales of rank structures across Special 
Constabularies. The proportion of Specials 
promoted, across the 42 forces with rank 
arrangements, varies from 7.5% to 32.5%. That 
proportion of promoted Specials is shown for 
the 42 Special Constabularies with rank 
structures in the graph below. It reflects that 
the national average of 14.8% is of limited use in 
summarising the national picture, given the 
sheer scale of variation in individual forces. 
As with the numbers of promoted Specials, the 
ratio of Special Sergeant to Special Constable 
varies very widely across different police forces. 
A sizeable number of police forces have been 
undertaking reviews or other similar exercises 
to consider their current arrangements in 
respect of Special Constabulary ranks. There 
have been more than ten such reviews in forces 
over the past year. However, there has been 
little coordination or communication across 
these processes. As such, the reviewing of 
models in individual forces is unlikely to drive 
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much, if any, convergence across the national 
picture.  
The outcomes of these reviews have taken local 
arrangements in widely differing directions, 
some establishing volunteer Special Chief 
Officers or adding ranks, others removing such 
roles and ranks. Many reviews seem to be led by 
a regular officer or by police staff and very few 
by Specials leaders themselves. Often the 
review lead has had little direct prior experience 
of the Special Constabulary. Often such reviews 
appear to have had little cognisance of similar 
processes, even where they have been recently 
completed in neighbouring forces. In many 
cases, reviews appear to have been prompted 
by issues and concerns relating to personalities, 
style and relationships within existing senior 
Specials teams. Some restructures have 
arguably been utilised to remove senior ranked 
individual Specials who were seen as 
problematic, as much as they were concerned 
with a more strategic, reasoned or broader 
development of a leadership model or strategy. 
Despite this sizeable scale of investment in 
recent review work, or (as reflected above) in 
part because of it, the 42 police forces which 
have rank arrangements in their Special 
Constabularies display a very wide variety of 
different models. One aspect of variation is in 
terms of the number of different ranks. In 
summary, the national picture currently looks as 
follows: 
- 31 Special Constabularies have a rank
structure which includes having a
volunteer Special Chief Officer role;
- Of those 31, 17 forces have Specials at
most ranks, including at least some
officers in S/Superintendent or Assistant 
Chief roles; 
- Of those 31, 12 forces have ranks up to
S/Chief Inspector, and then a Chief
Officer role;
- For the remainder of the 31: 2 forces,
have Specials up to the rank of Inspector
and then a Special Chief Officer role;
- 4 forces only have ranks up to Inspector;
- 2 forces only have ranks up to Chief
Inspector;
- 3 forces have ranks up to
S/Superintendent, but do not have a
Special Chief Officer role. In two of these
forces (Hampshire and Wiltshire), there
is a S/Superintendent role which in
effect functions similarly to the Special
Chief Officer role;
- 1 force has a spread of ranks up to
Assistant Chief level, but there is a
regular Superintendent as head of the
Special Constabulary;
- 1 force has a spread of ranks up to
Assistant Chief level, and a vacancy for
Chief Officer.
Whilst there has, as reflected above, been little 
coherence in recent developments in leadership 
rank arrangements and structures, it is possible 
to identify three broad patterns across recent 
changes: 
- A reduction in volunteer Special Chief
Officer roles, typically replaced by a
regular officer fulfilling a ‘head of’
Special Constabulary responsibility;
- An increase in the number of forces who
have thinned or removed their more
senior ranked Specials (e.g. reducing or
eliminating roles above S/Chief
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Inspector, and in some cases above 
S/Inspector); 
- Linked to the above two trends, a
tendency for strategy and senior
leadership responsibilities to be
exercised increasingly by police staff or
by regulars, rather than by Specials;
- A shift in several forces of insignia
towards a consistency with regular
ranks.
Overall, a huge degree of variation across forces 
can be seen. It is no exaggeration to say that 
every Special Constabulary rank arrangement is 
different in some way to every other force. 
Equivalent arrangements in the regular service, 
whilst allowing some local discretion in design, 
are in effect consistently structured, are 
regulated nationally, and have been for many 
years. The lack of systematic national 
consideration and focus over many years is 
evident, and is reflected in the significant 
investments made at the local level to review 
and reform models and rank structures to 
improve Specials leadership at force level. 
Ambiguity of seniority and authority 
One core contested aspect in relation to Special 
Constabulary leaders concerns the seniority and 
authority of Specials ranks. There are elements 
of a quite pervasive culture in policing that 
support one or more of the following 
statements as being true: 
- All regulars ‘outrank’ all Specials,
regardless of the rank of the Special
Constable;
- Specials are not able to command
regulars;
- Special ranks are not ‘real’, and that
whatever the rank of a Special, it is a title
without substance and ‘legally’ they
remain at constable rank.
Such views are not universal, but they appear 
widely shared. In producing this report no legal 
view has been sought as to the legal substance 
or veracity (or otherwise), in terms of current 
police regulations and legislation, of any of 
these claims. In terms of debates on the issue, 
both those supporting and those discounting 
such positions claim that there is a legal basis in 
support of their opinions. 
Clearly a widespread cultural positioning across 
policing that somehow Specials ranks are not 
‘real’, are ‘subordinate’ and carry no authority - 
whatever legal basis or otherwise there may be 
for such views – risks being fundamentally 
diminishing and undermining. It also appears to 
be quite old-fashioned, instinctively devaluing 
volunteers and contrasting unfavourably with 
other sectors. For example, in military reserve 
contexts, where there are very much more 
progressive views towards an equivalency of 
status of volunteers of rank. 
Such a culture towards Special ranks, whilst 
typically having its origins in questions of formal 
command, also casts a larger shadow across 
wider aspects of authority, seniority and scope 
of responsibility of volunteer Specials leaders.  
This perhaps is most visible in respect of more 
senior roles. Questions of seniority, authority 
and scope in modern policing organisations - 
where there is a broad spectrum of ranked 
regulars, senior police staff positions, and the 
like, all working together - are much more 
complex and nuanced than simply questions of 
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formal rank and line of command. A senior 
police staff member, perhaps in a chief officer 
role, clearly carries direct authority and 
leadership across others in the organisations, 
with a commensurate senior organisational 
status, despite no sense of formal command 
chain through rank. There is an argument that 
the ambiguity over the status, and ‘reality’, of 
Special leader role and authority, whilst 
originating in formal questions of ‘rank’ and 
command, ultimately shows more broadly 
through into a wider questioning of position and 
authority within the organisation more 
generally. Questioning whether Specials really 
lead areas they have responsibility for. 
The review processes of rank and leadership 
structures discussed in the section above is an 
interesting case in point, to consider the 
positionality of senior Specials leaders. Despite 
the number of such reviews across forces, it is 
difficult to point to one which was either 
commissioned by or led by the senior Specials 
team, rather than by regular officers or police 
staff. Several of those recent reviews have 
decided to abolish senior Specials ranks, and to 
shift those roles and responsibilities to police 
staff or regular officers. 
Such issues of culture - power imbalance, 
inferior status and lesser authority - seem to sit 
at the core of future challenges about Specials 
leadership. There are obvious cultural 
challenges in negotiating the role and status of 
part-time, volunteer leaders, who are, in 
cultural terms, ‘outsiders’ within wider 
leadership models in policing. Such issues seem 
deeply cultural and yet go largely both 
unnoticed and unchallenged. The picture varies 
widely across forces, and there are some 
examples to the contrary, but in many forces a 
reality of senior Specials teams exercising the 
true senior leadership of the Special 
Constabulary still feels a long way off. 
Equivalency with regular ranks 
There appears to be a consensus about wishing 
to see some convergence of how regular and 
Special ranks operate. There are a range of 
opinions in terms of how far such convergence 
evolves towards a full equivalency or inter-
operability of roles, i.e. a S/Sergeant and regular 
Sergeant, S/Inspector and regular Inspector, 
etc., in effect being trained and operating in an 
interchangeable manner. 
As reflected in the graph above, a majority of 
Specials would like to see some movement 
towards ‘a greater equivalency’ of ranks; albeit a 
quarter also disagree. 
For some Special leaders, the ultimate 
destination for the development of Specials 
ranks would be to emulate completely, or at 
least in all practical ways, the ranks of regulars. 
“Like the military, a rank is a rank, the 
same training, qualification, expectation, 
status.” (Special Chief Officer)
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For others, the idea of Special ranks developing 
to become inter-operable and equivalent in 
terms of training and capability is ‘a pipedream’, 
at least for a large majority of Special 
supervisors who would not have the time to 
gain and maintain such qualifications, skills and 
experience. 
“I can’t see a time when most Specials will 
be able to do enough hours in the week to 
have the space to build the experience 
and do the preparation and revision to do 
a sergeant exam and then beyond that, to 
keep current and effective and all the 
ongoing build of experience to do an 
equivalent job.” (Special Chief Officer)
Such views typically see gaining that sense of 
full operational rank equivalency as being 
something a smaller proportion of Specials with 
the time and dedication to do so may wish to 
pursue, and they should not be precluded from 
doing so, but also apply a pragmatism that 
achieving a full sense of operational equivalency 
across all Specials is not feasible. 
“In the City of London they’re doing quite 
a lot of training for Sergeants, Inspectors 
where they make them take the OSPRE 
exams for Regulars.  I think that’s a great 
thing to do. I think there’s a bunch of 
Specials that would want to do this. But it 
is also limited to people that have got time 
to do it. So Special Constables who don’t 
have time to do that training would then 
automatically be excluded from becoming 
a Sergeant Inspector when actually they 
could be good leaders.” (Special Chief 
Officer)
However, whilst such views caution against 
seeking a ‘full equivalency’, most Special leaders 
want to see clearer standards, and within that 
to mirror substantial elements of regular rank 
profiles. 
“I can see a time when we have a clearer 
standard. There is a process, it sets a bar. 
It is probably different to regs, to OSPRE, 
but some of it can and should be the 
same. ” (Special Chief Officer)
Such thinking, even if it does stop short of the 
more purist position of full equivalency, would 
still support seeking to build a substantial 
proportion of operational qualification and 
operating into Specials ranks across from their 
regular rank counterparts. 
“Everything being exactly the same is a 
pipedream. What about 70%, 80%? Even 
50% or 60%. To create an operational 
substance, gravity, capability to the role. 
Without operational role and that front-line 
purpose and credibility our ranks shrink 
to being welfare, attendance, liaison, I 
think they should be more than that, they 
should be operationally capable, or we 
shouldn’t have them at all, or at least 
shouldn’t call them ranks, as that implies 
something about an operational chain of 
command.” (Special Chief Officer)
There were views expressed that it is important 
not just to frame Special leaders in terms of a 
progression towards equivalency with their 
regular counterparts, but also to recognise 
those elements of the role which are distinct. In 
particular supporting and managing volunteers, 
and (for more senior ranks) running a volunteer 
organisation. These elements call for different 
role descriptions and skills sets to regular 
counterpart ranks. 
Notwithstanding these future views about role 
equivalency and operational capability, there 
are many within the Special Constabulary who 
have concerns with the current situation. In 
basic terms, this is seen by them as the titling 
regular and Specials ranks the same, despite 
those ranks functioning differently, being 
differently capable, and having a very different 
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status. That is variously viewed as a ‘muddle’ 
and as a ‘risk’. 
“I think calling our people the same thing 
when they’re obviously not the same thing 
just isn’t good. No idea why we do that. I
preferred the distinct language of Section 
Officers.” (Special Constable)
“I think many Regulars hate seeing 
someone trump around their station 
pretending to be a Chief Inspector or 
whatever, when they’re not. I feel it’s like 
an insult to the Regular supervision, 
who’ve passed exams, have specific 
powers, carry massive operational 
responsibilities their Specials equivalents 
just don’t. The ranks to me are important 
but they are not equivalent in that way to 
the regs. Pretending they are does us no 
favours.” (Special Constable)
“I don’t think it helps having two different 
types of Inspector, and all that. Our 
leaders should be called something 
different. Still show they’re senior, but not 
that they’re Superintendent whatever. I 
heard the story of a senior Special who 
turned up at an incident, and some there 
thought he’d be taking over command of 
it. There are risks in the model of ranks we 
currently have, some real confusion for 
everybody.” (Special Constable)
Replacing Special supervisors with 
regular supervision 
Most Specials support maintaining Specials 
ranks. However, many would like to see regular 
supervision playing a ‘bigger role’. Those 
Specials typically frame this argument in terms 
of achieving better integration into regular 
teams. It appears such views are more prevalent 
amongst newer in service, regular-pathway 
Specials, who broadly tend to identify more with 
the regular service and less with the Special 
Constabulary. 
“Do away with the hierarchy that’s for the 
Specials and integrate them into the 
Regular workforce.” (Special Constable)
“I certainly think we could make more use 
of Regular Sergeants to supervise 
Specials and to sort of allocate tutors, call 
them in for duties, with the assistance of a 
Regular, of a Special Sergeant, the two 
types of Sergeant could work together, I 
think, a lot more.” (Special Constable)
“I’m just not sure that the senior 
management for the Specials is 
integrating as well as they should with the 
Regulars.  I think if the Specials were 
managed by the Regulars, Inspectors and 
so on, there would be a lot more 
integration, there would be much more 
use made of them.” (Special Constable)
Having said that, some are sceptical of moves 
towards a greater regular role in supervision, 
feeling that regulars tend to be very busy, have 
a large number of competing demands, bring 
variable levels of interest and support towards 
Specials, and bring varying levels of skill and 
understanding in respect of volunteers. 
I know some places have done away with 
it, and it’s been a disaster.” (Special 
Constable)
“I think the [Specials] rank structure 
provides so much, but that isn’t always 
seen by everyone. We’d quickly miss it if it 
wasn’t there. It’s low visibility but high 
importance and impact, in my opinion.” 
(Special Constable)
“Some will say just do away with it, but 
Specials supervisors do so much to fix 
problems, organise things, support 
people, welfare.” (Special Constable)
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Design and execution of rank 
structures 
There appears to be a mixed picture of the 
effectiveness of design and delivery of Specials 
rank arrangements. In some forces, substantial 
progress has been made to develop properly 
structured, and rigorously managed approaches. 
In others, it is clear that gaps in basic design and 
management remain. 
For some leaders in the Special Constabulary, 
getting these ‘basics’ right within their force was 
the most important aspect that needed 
addressing. 
“That absence of basic process, it’s 
lamentable. People get promoted, not 
always the right people, but the main thing 
is then they’re not supported, they’re not 
trained, they’re not even told what is 
expected of them. If they’re failing in the 
role, they’re typically not told that either.” 
(Special Chief Inspector)
“I was promoted to sergeant, absolutely 
no guidance or support or anything. If 
there was anything on paper about the 
role, I never saw it. To this day I have no 
idea, to answer your question, if any of 
our roles, including my current one, have 
a role description.” (Special Inspector)
Such perceived gaps in design, standards, 
structure and process included a range of 
elements spanning recruitment, induction, 
supervision, performance and training. 
Particularly foregrounded by many Specials 
leaders were perceptions that training 
represented a particular gap. 
“We want to aspire to better support 
Specials leaders… We don’t give any of 
our supervisors, we don’t give them any 
training at all as a supervisor. They get 
promoted, they’re expected to go on and 
do something, and there is no training 
whatsoever. If you said to lots of them 
what’s a major incident, they wouldn’t 
know, or if you asked what would you do 
in these circumstances. We don’t put in 
place any of that but some of it can and 
should be.” (Special Chief Officer)
Alongside training, recruitment was the other 
key area that Specials leaders felt was neglected 
in terms of process and achieving the desired 
robust, structured approach. In some cases, 
there was the right process in place, but 
challenges to achieving the process being seen 
as ‘real’, or for it to be ‘taken seriously’. 
“A new posting of Special Sergeant would 
have to be advertised. Usually there would 
be an interview. I don’t know if the 
interviews have got any better, but I can 
remember being on a panel and the 
regular senior officer [also on the panel] 
said, and said to me who was there as a 
Special myself, ‘we don’t need to worry 
about this one, we can just get through it 
notionally, they’re only a Special, we just 
need to write the answers in but she’ll 
pass’, and I thought well that’s what we’re 
accepting, and I didn’t feel in a position to 
be able to change that.” (Special Chief 
Officer)
One specific challenge to achieving effective and 
robust processes across rank arrangements was 
the challenge of attracting Specials to take on 
promoted roles. This absence of willing 
volunteers for roles was seen as either leading 
to the appointment of less suitable or 
experienced individuals, or to the creation of 
‘temporary’ and ‘acting’ arrangements over 
prolonged periods of time. 
“Quite often we hear Sergeants, well 
nobody told me that was my job.  Well 
they need to be made clear before they 
take the job on, what the job is.  But it’s 
finding suitable, interested people in the 
first place and there aren’t that many 
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around at the moment.” (Special 
Inspector)
“We put stop gaps in all the time. Until we 
can grow somebody who wants that 
responsibility, we have a gap. We either 
fill that gap, perhaps not with quite the 
right person or we live with having a gap. 
Perhaps wrongly we often do the former, I 
think.” (Special Chief Officer)
In some cases and contexts, there were views 
that the usage of ‘temporary’ arrangements was 
in part a mechanism for circumventing a more 
robust and transparent recruitment process. 
“Jobs for the boys. Jobs for their mates. 
There was one went from sergeant to 
temporary chief inspector in a year, he 
played football with the superintendent.” 
(Special Inspector)
“Jobs for mates. They get round the 
process by making everything acting, then 
after a while it quietly becomes full. Or if 
someone has acted for three years they’re 
a shoe-in anyway.” (Special Inspector)
Having identified such issues, it should also be 
reflected that many Specials felt that there had 
been a lot of progress from their perspectives of 
moving on from poor past processes and 
behaviours. 
“It’s not like the bad old days. Now every 
post is advertised, there is a board, 
there’s a process. Involving senior regs 
and HR as well as our leaders. It’s much 
better than it was.” (Special Inspector)
Gender and leadership 
Data about demographics across Special 
Constables is difficult to obtain from forces, due 
to poor data collection processes, unreliable 
datasets (many are out of date) and resource 
limitations to export and clean datasets for 
sharing. Data relating to gender has been 
collected to inform this report, however data 
relating to ethnicity was not available at this 
time. This will be a priority for further analytical 
work.  
Data across the Special Constabulary reflects 
that female Specials are significantly under-
represented in promoted ranks. The gender 
balance at different ranks, across all Special 
Constabularies in England and Wales, is 
summarised in the table and graph below. 
% for each rank Male Female 
S/Constable 69.3 30.7 
S/Sergeant 84.5 15.5 
S/Inspector 87.3 12.7 
S/Chief Inspector 87.4 12.6 
S/Supt & above 88.0 12.0 
Looking at trends in female representation in 
promoted ranks, the pattern of change over the 
past three years presents a mixed picture. There 
has been some increase in the proportion of 
females (albeit from a very low base) in the 
highest ranks of S/Superintendent and above. 
The proportion of female S/Sergeants has 
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remained the same, and proportions of female 
S/Inspectors and S/Chief Inspectors have both 
fallen. 
% Female by rank 2016 2019 
S/Constable 31.3 30.7 
S/Sergeant 15.6 15.5 
S/Inspector 16.1 12.7 
S/Chief Inspector 16.6 12.6 
S/Supt & above 8.8 12.0 
Female representation at rank is greater for 
regulars than it is in the Special Constabulary. 
% Female by rank Regulars Specials 
Constable 31.4 30.7 
Sergeant 22.6 15.5 
Inspector 23.0 12.7 
Chief Inspector 24.8 12.6 
Supt & above 25.2 12.0 
Alongside this statistical picture, many Special 
leaders recognise the importance and the scale 
of challenge in achieving a more equitable 
engagement of female Specials within 
leadership teams. 
“Nearly half of our Special Constables are 
female. Nearly all our sergeants and 
inspectors are male. Is that a problem? 
You bet it is. Look at who leaves the
service most, it’s our female officers.” 
(Special Inspector)
For some female Specials who are in promoted 
ranks, there was a sense of continuing 
challenges, including operating with some 
elements of a masculine culture and the 
isolating effect of ‘being the only woman in the 
room’. 
“I look up that leadership, right up to the 
top, it’s men… do I have it, that fight in 
me, one woman in that room of men?... 
yes, there’s still banter, yes, 21st century 
and section meetings I make coffees, yes I 
have been asked out by a senior Special, 
two of them as it happens” (Special 
Sergeant)
“Do I think it’s a sexist organisation [the 
Special Constabulary]? Yes, sometimes I 
think it is.” (Special Sergeant)
Female leaders in the Specials generally talked 
of seeking a balance. On the one hand, of not 
wanting to be viewed in terms of their gender. 
On the other, of feeling that there are 
dimensions of what females typically bring to 
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leadership environments that are distinctive to 
females and add value. 
“I don’t think of gender very often. I can 
see when people look at me differently, 
they might expect some different things 
from me. But I’ve never looked at it that 
way. I’m a female superintendent, get over 
it.” (Special Superintendent)
“There’s differences. Not getting into 
stereotypes, but women do bring different 
skills, different ways of thinking 
sometimes to men.” (Special Inspector)
A number of Specials leaders reflect the 
particular challenge of shifting the position in 
respect of gender engagement at rank. They 
highlight this as being a difficult issue for 
predominantly male leadership teams to make 
progress on, and also the sense of an absence of 
a ‘pipeline’ of female Specials who might evolve 
and progress in time to occupy more senior and 
strategic leadership roles in the future. 
“Is there a connection made between 
being a man and being a leader? I think 
that’s true across the whole of everything, 
not just Specials. It is difficult when every 
leader is a man, to effect that change. If 
we’re not careful, there aren’t women 
coming through [the ranks]. If there’s no, 
or hardly any, of us as sergeants and 
inspectors now, it’s not gonna magically 
happen we have a female chief officer in 
five years, is it?” (Special Inspector)
Some leaders challenge what they see as a 
gradual, evolutionary progression of the issue of 
female engagement in Specials leadership and 
look towards something more pro-active and 
perhaps more revolutionary, to create the 
required step-change from the current position. 
“I do look across the men leading the 
Special Constabulary, and I obviously 
include myself within this, within that, and 
I do ask myself, how equipped we, all us 
men of [a] certain age, are going to be to 
change it. It needs mixing up, the parallel I 
look for is in political parties, with quotas 
of MPs, female only shortlists. Not that 
long ago all legislatures around the world 
were men, now some are majority female, 
in most western countries it has begun to 
look different. It can change, but I’m not 
sure it ever can or will change gradually, it 
needs that jolt of lightning through it, like 
what those political parties have done, or 
we’re going to still be having this 
conversation, about us all being men, in 
ten or twenty or more years’ time. I look 
down into my rank structure, and how 
does it look at present, the succession, 
my successor, and it’s all men.” (Special 
Chief Officer)
For some at senior level, there was an ambition 
that the Special Constabulary could ‘forge the 
path’ and ‘lead the way’ in terms of diversity 
and gender, but only if it were able to move 
beyond current challenges and establish a 
stronger and more progressive position. Once 
again, the challenge is seen to be the absence of 
diversity of current leaders, in terms of being a 
barrier to achieving change in the future. 
Overall, there is recognition of the need for 
change in the gender profile of the Special 
Constabulary, but also some realism that such 
change has not been achieved over many years 
now, and that to achieve it will require 
something different to what has been tried 
before. 
Special Chief Officers 
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Introduction 
This chapter of the report focuses on the senior, 
strategic leadership of the Special Constabulary, 
particularly the role of Special Chief Officer. A 
majority of police forces across the country have 
a Special Chief Officer role, which is the most 
senior ranked Special in the force with a lead, 
strategic role in respect of the Special 
Constabulary. There is a very wide variation in 
role design and in how Special Chief Officers 
operate in different force contexts. 
Presently, 31 of the 44 Special Constabularies 
have a Special Chief Officer role. Of the 13 that 
do not have a Special Chief Officer: 
- one force has a vacancy in role for Chief
Officer;
- two forces have Special Superintendent
ranked leadership roles, which largely
reflect the role of Special Constabulary
Chief Officer;
- one force, Sussex, has a Special
Constable as Head of the Special
Constabulary but this is not a formally
ranked position (as the force does not
presently have ranks in its Special
Constabulary);
- the other nine forces have alternative
models of senior leadership involving a
role other than a volunteer Special
Constable leading the Special
Constabulary, in most cases a senior
ranked regular officer.
There has been a decrease in the number of 
forces with a Special Chief Officer role over the 
past 2-3 years, with 36 forces having such a role 
in 2016. 
This chapter of the report primarily draws from 
one-to-one research interviews conducted with 
twenty-four Special Chief Officers from forces 
across England and Wales. What is presented 
here only represents a brief summary of key 
themes from those research interviews; the 
findings of that research project will  also be 
reported in more detail in other products 
beyond this summary chapter. This research 
represents the most comprehensive qualitative 
research study of volunteer Special 
Constabulary senior leadership ever 
undertaken. 
Inevitably research of this nature will  emphasise 
challenges and areas for development and 
improvement. It is important to balance that by 
reflecting also upon the quality, contribution 
and commitment of those who volunteer such a 
great deal of their time in such senior and 
demanding roles. 
Strategic direction and challenge 
A majority of the Special Chief Officers 
interviewed reflected that they saw the current 
point in time as being a particularly significant 
and challenging one for the Special 
Constabulary. In many cases this was framed as 
a point of ‘crisis’ for the future of Special 
Constables, with concerns for the future viability 
of the model of Special Constables unless there 
is fundamental strategic repositioning of 
contribution, role and capability. 
“If this isn’t a crisis for the Special 
Constabulary, I am at a loss knowing what 
would constitute one. I could see us not 
having one [a Special Constabulary] 
within five, ten years, and you know that 
might very well be what some of them 
want.” (Special Chief Officer)
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In broad terms, this sense of ‘crisis’ strategically 
for the Special Constabulary was framed as 
manifesting in three interconnecting ways: 
- A sharp reduction in numbers, and
associated hours served and capability
(albeit most Special Chiefs were also
anxious not to focus unduly on the
‘numbers’ rather than quality and
impact);
- Significant perceived problems of
efficiency and effectiveness which they
saw as eroding the viability of the
Specials model; particularly in respect of
retention, a lack of consistency of
standards and professionalism, and
problems of culture, integration and
deployment;
- A sense that policing is changing, but
that the Special Constabulary is not
changing sufficiently to ‘keep up’ and to
‘adapt’, with perceptions of the absence
of overarching strategy and direction.
Some Chiefs think a fundamental strategic 
review is required. This reflected frustrations at 
what was perceived as the slow pace and 
limited scale of reform. For some Special Chiefs, 
current reform efforts were seen to be tactical 
and tentative at a time when they would like 
instead to see a more strategic and bold agenda 
of change. 
It’s important not to waste a good crisis, 
maybe this is our moment to seize the 
future, the Phoenix principle, you know, 
destroy to rebuild. So, maybe not burn it 
to the ground, but be prepared to dig right 
back to first base and do some major 
surgery. All I see at national level is lip 
service and tinkerers, not real change.” 
(Special Chief Officer)
For those who wished to see a review of the 
Special Constabulary, some framed it as being 
akin to calls for a ‘Royal Commission’ for 
policing; as an opportunity for a fundamental, 
root and branch assessment of the current state 
of the Special Constabulary, with the 
opportunity to make bold and fundamental 
recommendations for change.  
“What we need is the Royal Commission 
for the Special Constabulary, we need root 
and branch reform. There is so much to 
learn from the military, and from how they 
do this over in policing in the States, from 
the lifeboats. I don’t think policing is able 
to think that way, think sufficiently 
differently, on its own. It needs fresh 
people from outside, so yes, a Royal 
Commission, that would bring in those 
new heads.” (Special Chief Officer)
“So, I think there needs to be a 
fundamental review, legislatively, as to 
what our role, our responsibility is in the 
future.” (Special Chief Officer)
A phrase commonly used across interviews was 
‘disruptive change’, with a number of Special 
Chief Officers feeling that this was something 
that was generally lacking. This was both 
specifically in respect of the Special 
Constabulary, but also more broadly across 
policing. For some Chiefs, they felt that policing 
as a whole was ‘pedestrian’, ‘bland’, 
‘traditional’, ‘vanilla’, at a strategic level, lacking 
in ability or will to genuinely, radically change 
operationally or organisationally. One Special 
Chief talked of seeing the Special Constabulary 
as a potential ‘weapon of disruptive change’, 
but felt frustrated that regular officer senior 
leaders just saw it as a ‘side issue’ and 
‘unimportant’. Several of the Special Chiefs saw 
themselves personally as being a source of 
‘disruptive change’, often reflecting thinking, 
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experience and styles of operating they felt they 
were bringing as outsiders into policing. 
“Policing isn’t good at disruptive change. 
To be honest I think they see me just as 
disruptive, well I know they do, perhaps 
that’s what I am, a thorn in the side. If it 
doesn’t change radically, I do think that 
it’s going to die.” (Special Chief Officer)
This sort of strategic and bold thinking and 
change was viewed by Special Chiefs as being 
challenging organisationally and culturally; as 
being a major step beyond the styles of strategic 
leadership currently exercised in policing more 
broadly. 
“We talked about change is changing -
that kind of change is, today I think is still 
a step too far.” (Special Chief Officer)
Another phrase commonly used was ‘they won’t 
let you do it’; that the policing organisation did 
not provide a context in which Special Constable 
leaders were enabled or encouraged to be bold 
or innovative, despite the Special Chiefs 
themselves feeling that this was essential for 
future growth and development. 
“We try to push the boundaries with 
things like – PSU was one of the first 
things I did when I became Chief 
Officer… …And straight away a Regular
Superintendent who I get on with really 
well, said to me “You’re off your rocker.”  
He said, “If you're going to try and do that 
you are heading for a fall straight away. 
Don't do it. They will never let you do that 
in this force.”” (Special Chief Officer)
There was a recognition of the challenge of 
achieving strategic change from ‘top’ to 
‘bottom’ across forces and Special 
Constabularies. This included a sense of a ‘sticky 
middle’. The context they painted in interviews 
was that Special Chiefs sometimes were able to 
work effectively at senior level for change, and 
also that the Special Constabulary was making 
progress in terms of development and 
relationships on the front-line, but that there 
was a body of middle-ranking regular officers 
who were seen as ‘conservative’, ‘resistant’ and 
‘blockers’.  
“You actually need to put what is said into 
practice and I think, on occasions, it gets 
lost in translation.  Similar to [this Chief 
Officer’s work context], we at the top end 
may be very supportive of a collaboration 
idea or whatever.  The only problem is that 
once it starts going down the chain, it 
either gets lost in translation or it just 
plain gets lost.  And I think it’s that 
understanding really that Special 
Constables can provide real value to the 
Regular Force.  It can provide real 
specialist value to the Force because a lot 
of my Officers, same throughout the 
country, have got very specific skill sets 
within their profession and I think it needs 
to be realised from the top to the bottom 
that we can serve together and add value, 
instead of people feeling threatened.”
(Special Chief Officer)
For some Special Chiefs, the issue of the 
strategic future of the Special Constabulary has 
been neglected. They raised deeper questions 
of, in effect, whether anyone is exercising 
national strategic leadership in respect of the 
Special Constabulary. 
“It seems to me that these truly are such 
troubling times for the Special 
Constabulary. The years of neglect, 
locally, nationally, strategically in 
Government, by the NPIA and then the 
College, they are catching up with us all.
Policing has been asleep at the wheel. As I 
see it, the problem is that nobody is 
running it. In fact, let’s not say asleep at 
the wheel, the Special Constabulary, 
nationally, it’s driverless, rudderless in a 
stormy sea. The Regular Chiefs, NPCC, 
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would never let us Specials Chiefs do that, 
let us run it, but they’ve not been taking it 
on themselves either.” (Special Chief 
Officer)
In broad terms, the strategic aspirations for the 
future of the Special Constabulary, reflected 
across the Special Chief Officer interviews, point 
to four main areas of development: 
- Enthusiasm to explore new roles, expand
contribution and better focus
contribution on key strategic policing
gaps and challenges;
- A desire to professionalise, and to build
credibility, capability and consistency;
- Interest in exploring different models,
including learning from military
‘reserves’ and similar contexts;
- Seeking a more prioritised, valued,
integrated and resourced model for the
Special Constabulary.
For many Special Chiefs, the Special 
Constabulary represents an ‘unfulfilled 
potential’ and they see the future role for 
Specials as only being limited by culture and 
imagination. 
“What are we waiting for? Strategically? 
We’re only limited by our imaginations, 
our courage, and our culture. Policing 
resists change, WPCs, PCSOs, radios, 
throughout its long history. Every time, 
over time, it then comes to accept and 
eventually then to champion those things. 
The specialists, the cyber geeks, Specials 
in white hats [specialist roads policing], 
Special detectives, like all those things 
that have gone before, it’s just another 
change.” (Special Chief Officer)
There were frustrations about lack of systematic 
planning and structured strategic analysis. For 
some, they saw the police service as being ‘very 
poor at strategy’. They reflected that strategic 
planning was undertaken in very different and 
more structured, data-based, professionalised 
ways in their ‘day job’ contexts. A number of the 
Special Chiefs were bringing contexts in those 
‘day jobs’ where they are strategic consultants, 
senior executives or involved in other ways in 
corporate strategy. They sometimes found that 
those skill-sets were not appreciated or engaged 
with in their policing leadership roles. 
“Apply some science, some business 
strategy to it all. Needs. Gaps. Capability.” 
(Special Chief Officer)
“The police write lots of strategies but 
they don’t even know what a strategy is. 
What a plan should look like.” (Special 
Chief Officer)
For a number of the Special Chiefs, fundamental 
to the future strategic direction of the Special 
Constabulary were issues of professionalism and 
credibility. 
“It all boils down, in its fundamentals, to a 
credibility. If we can professionalise, shift 
the perceptions of who Specials are and 
what they can do, that is then the critical 
foundations upon which we then influence 
and shift and build something genuinely 
new and very different.” (Special Chief 
Officer)
For others, the need was to be more radical and 
to create something genuinely new and 
different. Central to such considerations was the 
idea of a ‘police reserve’. 
“It’s time to rip up the rule book and for us 
to do something new. A policing reserve, 
not a Special Constabulary.” (Special 
Chief Officer)
Overall, a sentiment across the interviews was a 
desire to ‘get serious’ about the future strategic 
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ambition and direction of the Special 
Constabulary. For many it was felt that the 
Special Constabulary was something of a 
Cinderella element within policing, an aspect of 
the organisation which had not benefited much 
from attention or resource over a prolonged 
period of time, and that because of this the 
potential risked being lost. 
“I think the difficulty you have still got is 
that there is a small budget for Special 
Constabulary and we are on occasion not 
seen as integral. If we are going to do this, 
we should be serious about doing it well.
You get out what you put in, and in recent 
years that hasn’t been very much.”
(Special Chief Officer)
Interpretations of the Special Chief 
Officer role 
The current picture of the senior leadership of 
the Special Constabulary is a complex and 
confused one, with a wide range of different 
models across force contexts. The role of Special 
Chief Officer has grown and evolved over many 
years, with relatively little steer or guidance, 
and often with little or no sharing of learning 
across force contexts. There is no system in 
place to advise nationally on Chief Officer roles 
or appointments, or to share best practice, 
albeit such support and coordination does occur 
on a more ad hoc basis, for example through the 
support of the Association of Special 
Constabulary Officers. 
There is a sense of development in constructs of 
the role; many Special Chiefs saw themselves as 
having a stronger and more pro-active approach 
to their leadership than they perceived had 
been the case with their predecessors.  
“My predecessor... in reality he used to 
pop into headquarters about once a week 
and he used to go and see the Specials 
coordinator to say ‘is there anything you 
need be to do’, and that was the sum 
total. ” (Special Chief Officer)
The focus for most Chiefs was on being there to 
support and to represent the Specials in their 
force. Special Chiefs often saw this as something 
they were uniquely well situated to do, and that 
they and they alone were dedicated to that role, 
rather than it sitting alongside a number of 
other competing priorities. 
“That phrase that leaders eat last. It is 
about that focus on supporting 
volunteers. We have the luxury, because it 
is our raison d’etre, of supporting 
volunteers, if you’re a regular
superintendent then supporting 
volunteers is still there but only as one 
small part of your role, and actually it’s 
not seen as that important alongside 
everything else.” (Special Chief Officer)
Alongside this prioritised element of visibly 
leading Specials, several Special Chiefs framed 
their roles as being about ‘change’, and within 
that of achieving changes in ‘style’ and in 
‘culture’ for the Special Constabulary. Such 
ambitions were typically framed as ‘reform’, 
‘professionalisation’ and ‘modernisation’. 
“We talk about policing culture, and we 
talk about organisational culture, well 
there’s a culture in volunteering as well, 
especially sometimes around this specific 
of police constable volunteers. That’s 
what we’re up against still, an archaic, old 
club mentality, that’s the cultural shift I 
wanted to make, move away from that, 
further professionalise.” (Special Chief 
Officer)
Some framed their role more broadly in terms 
of ‘change’, seeing themselves as catalysts and 
52 
Special Chief Officers 
agitators for change more broadly across 
organisational reform and management 
approaches in policing. This connects with 
frustrations about the style, as it was perceived, 
of some regular officer leaders. 
“I think you need to be a diplomat, and I’m 
more of a disrupter than a diplomat. But I 
think disruption is really good today in 
policing. Policing aren’t ready for that, but 
the dementors in the organisation, some 
of the middle management, old dinosaurs, 
silverbacks that exist need disruption, 
they need to - well they need to go.  It’s 
really simple because they’re the ones 
that are holding back the force from 
proper effective change to get anywhere.”
(Special Chief Officer)
Whilst Special Chiefs had, inevitably, different 
takes on their approach to their roles, there was 
a very strong caucus of support for greater 
consistency and coordination nationally. For 
many, the current lack of definition or 
recognition of the role at national level seriously 
undermines its status and credibility. 
“As long as everywhere is different, it’s all 
splintered forty however many times, 
we’re never going to get anywhere. Divide 
and rule, as they say.” (Special Chief 
Officer)
“I think if we want professionalisation of 
not only this Chief Officer role but ranks in 
general, the balance to that is we are 
going to have to accept that you also need 
consistency. It’s impossible to progress 
together and to walk down forty four 
different paths at the same time.” (Special 
Chief Officer)
There were desires to maintain the benefits of 
local discretion, and recognition that Special 
Chief Officer roles logically would continue to 
have some differences in terms of their 
dimensions and execution to fit local 
circumstances. However, the current ‘free for 
all’ was seen as ‘unhealthy’, and ultimately as 
being ‘destructive to the role and its wider 
credibility’; with arguments that forces being 
able to remove the role ‘at a whim’ 
undermined, in broader terms, all Special Chiefs 
nationally across forces. 
“Local discretion matters, but it matters 
less than national standards and 
consistency.” (Special Chief Officer)
There was optimism that there may be a 
growing enthusiasm at national level, both to 
support a national recognition of the role, and 
to produce guidance and support for the role. 
However, there were misgivings about the 
degree to which Chief Constables would be 
welcoming of, or accepting towards, a stronger, 
more directive framework of national standards 
and guidance and commensurate loss of local 
discretion. 
“I do think, from conversations I have had, 
I think that the current NPCC portfolio [the 
national Specials portfolio] sees the need 
for greater regulation, standardisation [of 
Specials ranks], but I don’t see them 
standing up to the Chiefs [Chief 
Constables], who always want to do it 
their own way.” (Special Chief Officer)
In terms of role design, it was recognised that 
the role is currently very demanding of time and 
commitment. This is felt to limit the individuals 
who are able to put themselves forward for 
such roles, and many Special Chiefs talked about 
how they were fortunate that their work and 
their personal circumstances allowed them a 
great deal of flexibility. 
“When I think of the twenty five hours a 
week, on average, I need to put into this.
Everything has changed completely, 
wholly different role we’re dealing with. I 
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don’t know how many people [could 
commit to the time requirement of the 
role]. I am lucky with the flexibility my 
work allows me.” (Special Chief Officer)
When asked what motivated them to apply for, 
and then to continue in, the Special Chief Officer 
role, Special Chiefs tended towards two primary 
areas of motivation: 
- A personal desire to support Specials;
- Being driven by the sense of a need for
change, and ‘the love of a challenge’.
“If it was easy I don’t think I’d still be here. 
It’s the scale of challenge that keeps me 
here.” (Special Chief Officer)
Value of role 
Special Chief Officers feel that they bring 
significant skills and experience from outside of 
policing both to their role and into the wider 
executive context of policing. They also 
highlighted the stability of appointment of most 
Special Chiefs, who tend to serve much longer in 
role than regular leads of the Special 
Constabulary, which provides valuable 
continuity. 
There were perceived benefits of ‘Specials 
leading Specials’, in terms of authenticity of 
leadership and thoroughly understanding the 
context and nature of the role.  
“Why have this role, my role? I am a 
volunteer. I am a police constable who is 
still on the front-line. If it’s a regular
officer, or if it is a police staff role, which 
heads the SC, they aren’t one and perhaps 
aren’t either of those things.” (Special 
Chief Officer)
“It is that aspect that I am what they are. I 
am a Special Constable. I like to think 
people see me and trust me because I am
an SC. I am not sure the same can ever be 
the case if it’s just the latest assignment 
for the next few months for a regular
Inspector, however committed they are, 
and in fairness that’s not always very 
committed, they always have one eye on 
what next...” (Special Chief Officer)
“That authenticity, that understanding, 
which if you haven’t worn this uniform as 
a volunteer, I do think it is very difficult to 
replicate that.” (Special Chief Officer)
Although they feel that their forces are often 
unaware or under-appreciative of what they 
bring from their external experience into the 
police service, Special Chiefs feel that they bring 
a great deal of skills, experience and strategic 
perspective that is of real value, and provides 
useful additionality to the skill sets and 
experience within the organisation. 
“Putting modesty aside, I bring a whole 
list of qualities to this role. I have been, I 
am, a Special myself. I have two decades 
at executive-level, top leadership teams, 
businesses many times larger [than this 
police force]... I bring some of that 
expertise into this police force which it 
doesn’t have and, again modesty 
notwithstanding, which it badly needs.” 
(Special Chief Officer)
“…. I did an MBA at Cranfield and spent 14 
years as a management consultant.” 
(Special Chief Officer)
“I'm a manager for a national construction 
firm. I’ve been responsible for delivery, 
circa nearly £10 million of work.  I lead a 
team of managers, which I do in the 
Specials. [In my day job] I need to 
implement different ways of working, 
implement change and get people’s buy-
in, which I do in the Specials as well.” 
(Special Chief Officer)
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‘Continuity’ and ‘stability’ were seen as 
important qualities in the leadership of the 
Special Constabulary, and Special Chiefs felt that 
they were effectively providing both of those 
things. In many of the interviews, they 
commented on the ‘churn’ and ‘short-termism’ 
that they saw in regular officer rank 
assignments, and that promotion processes and 
personal advancement were foregrounded 
before stability in regular rank appointments.  
“A stability, that’s what we bring. I am 
onto my fourth chief constable, lost count 
of how many leads we have had at 
[regular] Chief Inspector level.” (Special 
Chief Officer)
“I doubt if many people take notice but I
am the most experienced, I am the 
longest-serving member of our chief 
officer team.” (Special Chief Officer)
“Continuity, in a service where there is 
almost constant change.” (Special Chief 
Officer)
Akin to the development of more specialist 
roles, training and contribution for Specials, 
Special Chief Officers felt that the visibility of 
Specials operating at a senior, strategic and 
respected level within the organisation 
enhanced the overall positioning and status of 
the Specials as a whole, as well as carrying a 
sense of aspiration of future opportunities for 
some Specials who would be interested in 
occupying such roles in the future. 
“Any ranks, leadership structure, it is 
partly about aspiration, about younger 
Specials who might aspire to be in these 
kinds of roles in the future. Something to 
aim for and to achieve.” (Special Chief 
Officer)
Appointment, tenure and 
succession 
As with all aspects of Specials leadership, there 
is little if any consistency in the appointment 
processes, and related management of tenure 
and succession, for Special Chief Officer roles.  
In all cases of those Special Chief Officers 
engaged in this research, there had been a 
formal process of appointment, albeit these 
varied in terms of how ‘real’ and ‘substantive’ 
they were, and in some cases were perhaps 
more of a ‘formality’.  
In some cases, which appears to be an element 
of best practice, the appointment mirrored 
those of other Chief Officers in the force. The 
direct involvement of the Chief Constable in 
selection processes was also seen as effective in 
symbolising the importance of the role and 
weight of support ‘right from the top’ for the 
new appointee. 
In some cases the appointment was also opened 
to serving Specials from other forces, and 
occasionally also to individuals who were not 
serving Specials but who could apply as ‘direct 
entrants’. The opening up of processes is 
considered best practice, as it helps to widen 
senior and strategic leadership progression 
opportunities for Specials, as well as helping to 
import fresh thinking and learning at strategic 
levels across force boundaries.  
The impact of ‘direct entry’ at this level is still 
unclear – there are advantages in broadening 
the reach of skills and experience and in 
opening up to innovators and very different 
thinking. However, there are challenges in terms 
of direct entrants building up their experience, 
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credibility and authenticity as a volunteer 
constable. 
Many Special Chiefs feel that they, and the 
police service as a whole, need to do much 
more to support effective succession planning 
into senior Specials roles.  
“So I’ve seen a whole bunch of Senior 
Chief Officers come and go.  Some got 
there because they wanted the braid on 
their shoulder.  Some got there because 
they were the last one standing.” (Special 
Chief Officer)
Many Special Chiefs reflected that there was 
nothing structured or systematically in place to 
identify and develop future senior leaders. 
Some also reflected that they could not see 
where, within their current ranks, were the 
strategic leaders of the future. There is merit in 
thinking more holistically about succession in 
Specials leadership, of which this aspect of 
‘leadership at the top’ is just one key 
component. 
Tenure and related issues of opportunity at 
senior level present challenges. As reflected 
earlier in this report, there are perceived to be 
advantages in the stability of longer-serving 
senior Specials, contrasted against what is a 
constant ‘churn’ of portfolios for regular senior 
ranked officers. However, that stability can also 
freeze out opportunities for new people, 
approaches and thinking, and create a ceiling for 
progression. In some contexts, progression in 
the Special Constabulary at senior level is, as 
one Chief Officer put it somewhat flippantly, 
‘like waiting for the Pope to die’. There were 
some concerns that the pattern of Special Chiefs 
serving often for a decade or longer could 
sometimes result in senior leadership becoming 
‘stale’. 
Some forces are operating a model of fixed-
term tenure for Special Chief Officer roles; 
typically of three years or five years, and 
typically with opportunity (with formal process) 
for one period of extension. Such a model 
appears to have significant merit. It was 
identified by some that such models produce a 
challenge of what fixed-tenure Special Chiefs do 
after their period as Chief Officer is over, and in 
essence how to retain them in other roles. For 
some Chiefs, no doubt this will not personally 
present a problem and they will be happy to 
return to lower-ranked roles in the Specials. 
However, for others there is a risk of such 
arrangements triggering the departure of 
talented individuals who still have a great deal 
to give. Some of the options discussed later in 
this report, in the next chapter on the national 
context, may provide answers for some such 
individuals, in terms of options to consider 
building more regional and national 
opportunities for Specials leaders. 
Working with and ‘fitting in’ with 
other ‘Citizens in Policing’ roles 
Whilst the picture has a lot of variability, with 
some police forces losing police staff resourcing 
for supporting Specials and volunteers, on the 
whole recent years have seen an increase in 
both police staff and regular officer roles 
supporting Specials, and in many forces a 
coming together of such roles under the new 
umbrella construct of ‘Citizens in Policing’.  
Special Chief Officers welcome this injection of 
increased resource and support where it has 
taken place, but also tend to have experienced 
some difficulties in how their own roles have 
fitted with the formations of these broader CiP 
teams. 
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“I think if anything my role has become 
more ambiguous as other resources have 
come in and grown. So since Citizens in 
Policing, as a team, started to form some 
18 months ago now, there’s been 
increasing tension, for me it hasn’t been a 
happy place to work at all. You know I’ve 
had to stop most of my [Special 
leadership] team from resigning, and I’ve 
had times when I’ve considered, should I 
carry on?” (Special Chief Officer)
For some Special Chiefs in a few force contexts, 
there is an impression that the formation of a 
CiP model has been actively resistant to their 
presence and role, and has ‘not had room’ or 
has ‘actively worked around’ the concept of 
Specials in leadership roles. 
“I don’t think we fit their vision or are seen 
as being in their [Citizens in Policing] 
team. They seem to want a future where 
they don’t have any ranked Specials, so 
maybe it would be easier if we all quit.” 
(Special Chief Officer)
In some cases, this has been in part about 
personalities. In others simply a question of 
natural complexities and working out new 
relationships, with challenges for all parties 
understanding the ‘wiring’ and communication 
when several roles, some of them still very new, 
are working across a similar territory. 
“It’s just very hard work at the moment. 
There are the anomalies of who I meet 
with, which events, boards, I attend. And 
which the CiP team leader attends. I’ve 
asked to have regular meetings, I feel 
there are things I see, I understand and 
feel need an attention, which some of 
those police staff roles do not understand 
in quite the same depth, quite the same 
way” (Special Chief Officer)
A quite common theme from Special Chiefs was 
a sense of being supported and respected, but 
nevertheless of not being ‘in the loop’ or ‘at the 
centre of things’. There were feelings that in 
some force contexts CiP teams had taken the 
focus of conversations and decision-making 
away from Special Chiefs and their senior 
Specials teams. 
“People are friendly, they do talk to me, 
engage me. It’s short, gossipy chats, 
though, not the opportunities to chew 
over or shape issues. My impression is 
other people are seen as doing that, not 
me.” (Special Chief Officer)
“But yes, so I think I am consulted, I am 
involved at a strategic level but I do
sometimes think, things can occasionally 
be a fait accompli before it gets to me 
which then makes it difficult to push 
back.” (Special Chief Officer)
“The investment is tremendous and we all 
welcome it, of course we do. This reform, 
this force-wide change project [focused 
on the Special Constabulary] has been run 
by others and has been run around me 
and around my team. From my standpoint, 
of course, I see that as a shame, but I also 
do not want to take anything away from 
what has been achieved. Perhaps in time 
our roles, my role, will settle down, will 
establish once again, once we achieve 
some of those project objectives.” 
(Special Chief Officer)
As with all aspects of the picture in respect of 
Special Constabulary leadership, the dynamics 
referenced above apply to some police force 
contexts, and not all. In parallel to the above 
experiences in some areas, in other forces the 
picture seems more integrative of and 
collaborative with Special Chiefs.  
Identity and status as ‘Chief 
Officers’ 
Whilst there is widespread variation across the 
country, the interviews with Special Chief 
Officers revealed that for most there were 
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significant cultural challenges at senior level in 
terms of their status, role and relationships.  
In many cases, this reflected a tension between 
being formally designated as being a ‘Chief 
Officer’ and having membership of the police 
force Chief Officer team, but of not in reality 
being enabled to occupy, or being seen as 
having the authority and status of, that position 
of executive seniority within the organisation. 
There were also challenges of some force 
contexts in which the Special Chief Officer role 
does not have the leadership space, 
responsibility and ability to ‘call the shots’, in a 
manner that resulted in the role being only 
‘partial’ or ‘symbolic’ in its execution. 
“I wear this uniform, the uniform of an 
Assistant Chief Constable. The Chief 
Constable has said he sees that as being 
my level in the organisation. But I’m not 
sure, with every day the experiences I 
have, that he, or perhaps it’s the people 
around him, actually means it.” (Special 
Chief Officer)
As a senior voluntary role, within a context 
where other executive strategic roles are 
regular officers or police staff, the Special Chief 
Officer role seems to occupy an unhelpfully 
ambiguous space in most police forces. 
“Am I a real one? That’s how I feel.” 
(Special Chief Officer)
“I sit at the ACC level, allegedly.” (Special 
Chief Officer)
“I am line managed by the Deputy Chief 
Constable… a few feathers were ruffled 
achieving that, and that line management 
is very loose, I have not seen my line 
manager for several months… So this is 
the anomaly, they see me, they say, as the 
executive lead for citizens in policing, but 
there is an SRO [senior responsible 
officer] who is an ACC, there are other 
senior managerial roles that effectively 
also lead. So they have given me a sort of 
titular responsibility, like an archbishop 
who is given some title from a distant part 
of the world but has never travelled there, 
just to say he is the archbishop of 
somewhere, but it doesn’t really mean 
anything. In reality I carry none of the 
responsibility, I don’t carry the budget. So 
I am announced by the title, but in the end 
of the day what does that mean, it doesn’t 
give me any responsibility, it doesn’t give 
me any authority.” (Special Chief Officer)
There are descriptions of the status and 
authority of being a Special Chief Officer as 
often being experienced ‘in theory, but not in 
practice’. A theoretical senior status of being a 
Chief Officer is, in effect, undermined by cultural 
assumptions that all Special Constables are 
subordinate to, and outranked by, all regular 
officers. This sense of ‘subordination’ had 
undermining effects on the ability to position 
and function as a genuine executive-level 
leader. 
“In theory, yes. In practice, there is no 
power apart from what people will do out 
of respect to me personally. If I ask a 
regular officer to do something, at the end 
of the day they still see an SC, most of 
them will see that relationship as them 
outranking me, whatever uniform they 
wear and I wear.” (Special Chief Officer)
“So, all of this, it’s very nebulous really. I 
achieve things through my personality, 
relationships, who I can influence, who I 
can bring with me. If people say ‘why 
should we’, then that’s as far as I can go. 
So, lots of influence and I think respect, 
yes, but that all feels very personal. There 
is very little positional or formal authority 
and power specifically down to this rank, 
this role.” (Special Chief Officer)
For some of the Special Chief Officers, they have 
experienced their positioning within the 
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organisation as being seen as a ‘threat’ by senior 
ranked regular colleagues. 
“Sometimes it is threatening, there is an 
established culture, pecking order, 
authority, we come in, we are outsiders to 
that and we challenge that, we disrupt it. It 
is very clubbable at the top of policing, 
many senior officers have known each 
other for a very long time. They are not 
always sure where we fit in that, if we fit in 
it at all.” (Special Chief Officer)
It is evident across a number of the Special Chief 
Officer interviews that they see the existence of 
a strongly established ‘order’ of close (and 
closed) relationships and entrenched ways of 
working and thinking amongst senior regular 
officers, that the Special Chief Officers feel like 
they ‘rub up against’ and ‘don’t quite belong to’.  
“You get them who are here all day, 
they’ve got their network and that holds 
more sway than somebody who steps in, 
steps out… Specials are easy to ignore.” 
(Special Chief Officer)
“It’s a bit like coercive control… a 
controlling relationship from the regular
side of the business, so they keep you 
powerless, they’re always trying to 
undermine you, if we [Special Chief 
Officers] don’t do what they want then 
they take it out [remove the role]… you are 
effectively powerless and it’s not healthy.” 
(Special Chief Officer)
Reflecting what they saw as their cultural 
positioning within the organisation, many of the 
Special Chief Officers expressed frustrations at 
the sense of ‘blockage’ that this cultural context 
presented to ‘getting things done’. 
“It’s a frustrating role. You make a 
recommendation and they are often 
ignored, quite honestly” (Special Chief 
Officer)
“It takes so long to establish anything 
because of our status… ” (Special Chief 
Officer)
This context means that for many of the Special 
Chief Officers, they do not feel that their forces 
recognise, appreciate or utilise the skills sets 
and experience that they bring. 
“But also why criticise and demean me 
because what they don’t realise is
everything I bring… but they won’t trust 
me to make a decision… we are just 
discounted…I think we ought to use a 
skills analysis to say let’s not demean 
Specials, let’s utilise them.” (Special Chief 
Officer)
“I manage this organisation [where the 
Special Chief works as their ‘day job’].  I 
argue with Chief Constables that I could 
manage their organisation.  I don’t have to 
be a warranted officer to manage the 
Police Force as a business… but we 
should use those skill sets and I think the 
whole issue around rank structure, I do 
think it’s the insecurity of the Regulars.  
They feel threatened and I think that’s not 
a good mature relationship.” (Special 
Chief Officer)
The part-time, volunteer nature of Special Chief 
Officers also collides with 9-5 weekday 
executive patterns of working in police forces. 
“The senior meetings are starts between 9 
and 10, finishes at 3 or 4, on a weekday. If 
the role [as Special Chief Officer] requires 
attending that, it rules most people out of 
the role. I once suggested we hold some 
meetings at weekends and the looks on 
the faces…” (Special Chief Officer)
Professional development and 
support of senior leaders 
There was a recognition that more could be 
done to develop a structured model of 
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professional development for senior leaders in 
the Special Constabulary. This could involve: 
- Further delivery of national training
delivered by the College of Policing; this
has been well received historically by
Specials leaders. The College is currently
in the process of re-commencing this
programme of training for more senior
ranked Specials;
- There is an argument for building an
additional training and development
programme aimed at a more strategic,
senior level above the ranks primarily
targeted in the currently re-commencing
College provision. If this were only aimed
at newly appointed senior Specials, a
challenge to this would be relatively low
numbers; for example, if it were aimed
at new in role Chiefs and equivalents,
then typically there are only two or three
such appointments per year nationally
presently;
- Additionally, or alternatively to that,
another model might be a
developmental programme, involving
tailored CPD, mentoring and other
aspects, which could be provided across
all Special Chiefs, and perhaps a small
number of other senior ranked Specials.
There is also an opportunity to better engage 
Specials leaders across the current broader 
national senior leadership provision in policing. 
Participation by senior Specials in national 
policing leadership and related developmental 
programmes is currently very limited. 
Several Special Chiefs suggested that enabling 
attendance on the Strategic Command Course 
would be beneficial; albeit there were also 
reflections that for many the time commitment 
that this would involve would be prohibitive. 
Linking to these debates of professional 
development and support for senior Specials 
leaders, there were views that there also needs 
to be a more developed ‘future leaders’ model 
for the Special Constabulary. This could involve 
a nationally coordinated scheme through which 
forces identified Specials from their Special 
Constabularies with aspiration and potential to 
develop into the senior leaders of the future. 
Greater flexibility of leadership 
journeys within policing 
Some Specials leaders saw a future vision where 
there was much greater flexibility in, and across, 
all aspects of leadership in policing. They could 
foresee a future where regular senior leaders 
had careers which were more flexible, and took 
them in and out of policing, including growth of 
more direct entry and similar models. In this 
context, a future could be contemplated in 
which a regular leader may take time out of 
policing in another sector or leadership role, and 
retain a direct involvement in policing through 
exercising a leadership role voluntarily in the 
Specials during that time. Or a volunteer 
Specials leader might have a period of time 
when they became paid and occupied a 
different, full-time leadership role in policing. In 
such thinking about the future, one Special Chief 
talked of getting beyond the “different species” 
model of thinking about volunteer and paid 
leaders, to a much more mutually respectful and 
interchangeable context.  
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Other models of senior leadership 
and command 
The background research for this section of the 
report has focused on interviewing volunteer 
Special Chief Officers; it is recognised, as such, 
that it has focused on those forces with Chiefs, 
and paid much less attention to those models 
which do not have Chiefs, and those which also 
do not have senior Special ranks more generally. 
Whilst the IPSCJ has not directly researched and 
interviewed those who are leading the Special 
Constabulary but are not volunteers, it has 
worked directly with almost every individual in 
such a role over the past two years, and had 
many discussions about the pros and cons of the 
different arrangements. Broadly speaking, the 
perceived ‘pros’ of having a regular officer, or 
other paid role, heading the Special 
Constabulary are: 
- The regular often has stronger
relationships, influence and leverage
across the force to enable them to ‘get
things done’;
- The regular is able to be around more,
and attend meetings and network in the
force on behalf of Specials, because they
simply have many more hours in their
full-time working day to give to the role,
and in particular are more available 9-5 
weekdays when many meetings occur
and key stakeholders are available;
- The regular is often seen to have a
clearer ‘command’ authority, which
helps in ‘getting things done’;
- Having a regular in the role is seen as
helping with a more integrated, and less
separate, approach;
- Several forces feel they have had
problems with the style and approach of
their volunteer Chiefs, in effect finding
them difficult to ‘manage’, there being
clashes of personalities, or thinking that
they are not performing. Some forces
which have recently stepped away from
having the role have been influenced by
such factors. As such, one perceived
advantage of a regular is that they are
more clearly under command and seen
as manageable;
The ‘cons’ can broadly be summarised as: 
- A loss of the authenticity, ‘voice’ and
experience-based understanding that
comes (or should come) when volunteer
Specials are led by a volunteer Special;
- The short-term regular appointments
model and resultant churn of regulars in
such roles, which often means every 12-
18 months there is a new individual in
role;
- Sometimes regulars in such roles have
limited history, understanding and
briefing in respect of the Special
Constabulary when they come into the
role;
- In contrast to the time aspect discussed
as a ‘pro’ above, some regulars in such
roles have a broader portfolio of which
the Specials is just one part, and
therefore only have limited time
available to dedicate to the agenda;
- Sometimes regulars are placed in such
roles because of wider contextual
factors, which preclude them from other
roles, rather than as a positive choice or
selection;
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- There are aspirational (i.e. other Specials
aspiring to occupy leadership roles) and
symbolic (i.e. a senior volunteer officer
being seen to have influence, status and
authority) which are lost if the Specials
are not led by one of their own;
- In some models, where the whole of
senior ranks are removed, there can be a
resultant lack of focus and capacity on
Specials leadership issues;
- What volunteer Special Chiefs may be
perceived to lack in terms of their
internal network and leverage (their
‘insider’ benefits), they can more than
make up for in terms of their external
skills sets, experience, culture and
experience, which can potentially be
highly valued assets in senior teams.
Beyond this high-level summation of ‘pros’ and 
‘cons’ there sits a wide variation in execution of 
role both by volunteer Chiefs and by regular 
leads. There are regular leads who are highly 
visible, empathetic, incredibly well informed and 
personally committed leaders of their Specials, 
and there are some Special Chiefs who are little 
visible and out-of-touch with their front-lines. 
Likewise, there are some Special Chiefs who 
operate in an empowered way at very senior 
levels and are highly influential in force, and 
some regular leads who carry little ability to 
influence and achieve change. As with all things 
in the Special Constabulary, the picture is very 
mixed, and any attempt to summarise and 
simplify will immediately be challenged by 
exceptions to the rule. 
Overall, whilst there is much that can and needs 
to be done to clarify the Special Chief role, to 
produce a clearer and more consistent sense of 
the standard and leadership expectation 
nationally, to enable and empower Special 
Chiefs to operate and to break down some of 
the cultural barriers that they often face, there 
do seem to be some significant advantages to 
having a Special Chief role. Where Special Chief 
roles work well, they contribute a distinct and 
significant value, and not only directly to the 
Specials but also more widely to the strategic 
leadership of their force. 
National leadership 
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Introduction 
This chapter of the report focuses on leadership 
in the Special Constabulary beyond the level of 
individual forces, analysing how Special 
Constabulary leadership comes together 
collaboratively across forces, and at a national 
level in respect of strategy, national ‘voice’ and 
representation. It is clear from the research 
activity that most of the energy and resource of 
Special Constabulary leaders is currently 
concentrated within their police forces. Whilst 
this is their primary focus, it does mean that 
models of leadership collaboratively and at a 
national level are less formed and resourced. 
For most Special Constabulary leaders there is 
some occasional attendance at regional 
coordination meetings, but in the majority of 
cases there is no engagement at national level. 
Drawing on the responses of Special Constables 
in the national survey, perspectives are mixed 
about how effectively the voice of Special 
Constables is heard in national debates about 
the future of the Special Constables. Tellingly, 
the largest single category of response (over 
one in five Specials) was ‘no opinion’, suggesting 
this is an aspect regarding which Specials are 
less well informed, interested and engaged.  
Whilst over a third of Specials felt that the voice 
of Specials is heard nationally in such debates, 
the majority of that agreement was in the 
‘slightly agree’ response. Only 5% of Specials 
‘strongly agreed’ that the voice of Specials is 
heard in national debates, with a larger 
proportion (almost 15%) ‘strongly disagreeing’.  
Likewise, perspectives were mixed in the 
national survey as to whether Special 
Constables felt informed about national strategy 
in respect of the Special Constabulary. Whilst, 
positively, 43% of Specials agreed that they felt 
well informed, almost half (49%) disagreed, with 
approximately a fifth (19%) ‘strongly 
disagreeing’.  
Senior projection of the Special 
Constabulary 
A theme which was identified across a number 
of interviews, particularly with the Special Chief 
Officers, was a concern about how the Special 
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Constabulary was projecting itself at the senior, 
strategic national level in policing, feeling that 
there were problems with the tone and style, 
and gaps in a national-level leadership 
conversation and consensus. There were 
concerns from some that Special Constabulary 
leaders did not always project themselves 
‘credibly’. 
“We really don’t help ourselves though, 
do we? I mean, we don’t sell ourselves 
nationally [as Special Chief Officers] as a 
terribly credible bunch.” (Special Chief 
Officer)
Part of this sentiment reflected concerns over 
the ‘tone’ of the debate. In particular relating to 
social media, several Special Chief Officers were 
concerned that what they variously described as 
‘twitter spats’ and ‘Linked In battles’ between 
Special Chief Officers risked negatively 
impacting upon the reputation of Special 
leaders more broadly in policing. 
“I hate to see some of what’s on social 
media. We do sometimes let ourselves 
down with a tone that is unguarded and 
unprofessional. Having said all of that, I 
100% understand why many colleagues 
feel that way. The official voice [ASCO], it 
doesn’t have spark and it doesn’t have 
bite. So, yes, I dislike it, the social media,
but I also do understand why it’s 
happening.” (Special Chief Officer)
For others, there was a frustration that Special 
Constabulary leaders, and within that 
specifically Special Chief Officers, had difficulty 
in reaching consensus positions and a common 
ground about the way forward on many issues. 
“It would help if we ever agreed on
anything.” (Special Chief Officer)
Getting together 
One specific concern related to the lack of 
infrastructure and opportunities to ‘come 
together’, as leaders of Special Constabularies. 
Many interviews regretted the absence since 
2016 of what had previously been well-received 
bi-annual national Special Constabulary 
conferences, and reflected that the ASCO 
national conference in Moreton-in-Marsh in 
2017 was the last occasion when a majority of 
Special Chiefs had been in the same room at the 
same time. 
“We used to have the conference, at least. 
It wasn’t perfect, I could tell you some
tales, but it was an opportunity for us all, 
or at least most of us, to be together. Now 
they’ve even taken that away. We all have 
to be Citizens in Policing now. If we never 
see each other, and for the past two or 
three years, since Chepstow, I actually 
have not seen that many of my colleague 
Chiefs, we will never get better at working 
together.” (Special Chief Officer)
There was discussion across interviews with 
Special Chief Officers about the benefits of 
various forms of remote and virtual working 
together, including via ‘What’s App’ groups and 
similar. However, there was a broad consensus 
that meeting up physically was a very important, 
but recently neglected, aspect of senior Special 
Constabulary leaders working more effectively 
together. 
“We need to meet [as Special Chiefs]. 
Once a year for a day, even twice a year. I 
am a strong believer in dialogue. ASCO 
can’t do that for us at the moment, most of 
us aren’t even in it anymore, so perhaps 
the College could do that for us? Or CiP 
[the national Citizens in Policing 
portfolio]?” (Special Chief Officer)
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For many Specials leaders, even at Special Chief 
Officer rank, there was a sense of estrangement 
from the national agenda and debate. For many, 
this amounted to a conscious decision to not 
engage. This sense of ‘keeping a distance’ from 
the national context seems partly driven 
through a desire to focus time and energy on 
their local Special Constabulary and partly borne 
of a frustration with the national scene.  
“I never hear anything [about the national 
picture relating to the Special 
Constabulary]. I am sure people are doing 
good work, but I never see any of it.
Couldn’t tell you a thing about it.” (Special 
Chief Officer)
“Nationally? Am I allowed to swear… 
there, that’s my assessment of that. I 
learnt a very long time ago to stay right 
away from it. I assume they’re all still 
having their meetings, planning their 
gongs, but I never hear anything. Which, 
don’t get me wrong, I find that a good 
thing. I’m very happy here in force, 
concentrating on our people.” (Special 
Chief Officer)
These findings would point to the need for: 
- A model for all Special Chiefs to be able
to meet together, at least annually;
- To improve upon current models to have
a single, managed communication
network amongst senior leaders in the
Special Constabulary – accessible to all,
and engaged by all. Current
arrangements risk engaging some but
not all senior leaders;
- A reinstatement of the Special
Constabulary conference model.
National ‘voice’ and representation 
Whilst the issue of representation of Special 
Constables is a broader one than simply being 
about leadership, views about the national 
‘voice’ and ‘influence’ of the Special 
Constabulary were very much focused upon by 
research participants, particularly Special Chiefs. 
The discussion mainly focused upon ASCO (the 
Association of Special Constabulary Officers), as 
the primary national ‘voice’ and organisation for 
Specials. A caveat to the discussion of findings 
that follows is that some fieldwork was 
undertaken as long as 18 months ago, and ASCO 
is on a change journey as an association, which 
may mean things have already changed. 
The Association of Special Constabulary Officers 
(ASCO) is the primary representational and 
engagement body for Special Constables at a 
national level. Evolving from its predecessor, the 
Association of Special Constabulary Chief 
Officers (ASCCO), the organisation has evolved 
with an intent to broaden its membership and 
focus to seek to represent all Special Constables 
at a national level.  
For Special Chief Officers, the vast majority of 
interviews expressed some degree of frustration 
in respect of ASCO, in terms of what they saw as 
past limitations and also reflecting a scepticism 
of many Special Chiefs of the likelihood of future 
change. More broadly, beyond Special Chiefs 
and across the Special Constabulary as a whole, 
for Special Constables the pattern is of a patchy 
knowledge of ASCO, with that awareness 
seemingly highly variable between different 
force contexts. 
The common framing of the past of ASCO was of 
an ‘old boys’ club’, a phrase used multiple times 
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and across a majority of interviews with Special 
Chiefs. 
“When it [ASCO] first started it was an 
absolute old boys club, it was a select
bunch of Special Commandants… an 
organisation that really just looked after 
Special Chiefs and looked after itself.”
(Special Chief Officer)
For many, there was a mix of respect for those 
leading ASCO alongside doubts that ‘it can never 
change’. 
“To be honest, I like the people [leading 
ASCO] and I see and I respect the e ffort 
[that they put into ASCO]. But it’s never 
going to change. It is a bottleneck, it is a 
blocker” (Special Chief Officer)
Special Chief Officers seemed to divide into 
three broad areas of opinions in respect of 
future national organisation for the Special 
Constabulary: 
- The larger group (perhaps just over half)
who are presently largely or entirely
disengaged from the national scene, who
are sceptical in respect of ASCO, and
who would present themselves as likely
remaining ‘passive’ or disengaged with
any future national developments;
- A smaller group (perhaps a quarter) who
feel that ASCO needs to change, but
carry a greater optimism that a way
forward is achievable to reform ASCO.
Most of these individuals are currently
actively engaged in ASCO;
- Another smaller group of Special Chief
Officers who are more active in agitating
for change beyond the current ASCO
model and who would wish to establish
a direct alternative to ASCO.
“We are, as I have said, entering a new 
era, very different challenges. So, yes 
times like this call for new institutions not 
window dressing of current ones. Is ASCO 
a dog that’s had its day? Probably, but 
that is just my personal opinion, and I 
haven’t been involved in it at all for such a
long time.” (Special Chief Officer)
“The intention has to be to develop the 
organisation [ASCO]. Reform does feel 
like swimming upstream against an 
established order, what’s described as an 
old boy’s club, moving on from a club for 
select Special Chief Officers based on the 
adapted constitution of a golf club. So it is 
difficult but I believe, yes, I believe it is 
possible.” (Special Chief Officer)
Whilst there was recognition of the scale of 
journey that Special Chief Officers felt ASCO 
needed to make, there were also pockets of 
positivity about the progress that was perceived 
as now being made, and of optimism about the 
future, if the scale of change required was 
embraced. 
“I think we do recognise that, that if ASCO 
does not change it is probably going to 
die. A huge amount is happening, 
membership is up, there’s been a year or 
two of building new foundations but soon 
I do believe the change will be visible.”
(Special Chief Officer)
“Do I think ASCO can change? 
Tentatively, yes, I think I do. It’s from a low 
base, most of us even at Chief level aren’t 
there, round that table, engaged in it in 
any way, aren’t in that inner sanctum, and 
if it’s going to be reborn, it has to be all of 
us on that journey together, not a clique. It 
needs new blood, desperately needs new 
blood.” (Special Chief Officer)
Some Special Chief Officers questioned whether 
there was a clear enough sense of what ‘the 
future state needs to look like’. For some, this 
lay with stakeholders such as the Home Office 
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and the College of Policing being clearer about 
their expectations. Whilst for others, they felt 
that the future definition of an association for 
Special Constables should lie with Specials 
themselves. 
“I am aware that there have been many 
discussions with the Home Office about 
Specials and representation. What I don’t 
see is that clear remit, criteria, terms of 
reference. Does the Home Office really 
know what it wants, and is it clear what 
support it is prepared to provide to get 
it?” (Special Chief Officer)
“It is for us to define. I am not sure if we 
know what we want. We all know what we 
think is wrong with what we’ve got, but 
that’s a different matter.” (Special Chief 
Officer)
For some, there was a need for a definitive 
moment to define the future direction, with 
some feeling that ‘the issue is in a state of 
permanent drift’ or ‘not really going anywhere’. 
“It is the responsibility of us all. We need 
a national summit, to set out what we 
need a future organisation, association, to 
do for us. Perhaps if we had that bigger 
dialogue and debate, people would start 
coming back together and working 
together.” (Special Chief Officer)
It is not for a report such as this to suggest how 
Special Constables organise their 
representation; that rightly must remain a 
matter owned by and managed by Specials 
themselves. However, the report does point to 
some substantial, deep-seated concerns and 
frustrations with the current picture. It is clear 
that Specials are currently not represented, and 
do not have a structured representational 
‘voice’, to anything like an equivalent level, or 
with the resourcing, that other elements of the 
policing family do. It is also clear that a large 
majority of Specials are not currently members 
of, or engaged with, any representational 
organisation. 
The development of national roles 
and secondments 
Whilst the focus for senior Specials leaders was, 
as reflected in the discussion above, mostly on 
the future of representation and ASCO, there is 
also a wider picture of national ‘voice’, strategic 
contribution and influence.  
One set of arguments put forward by some 
Special Chiefs, relates to how leaders in the 
Special Constabulary contribute nationally to 
the strategic direction and development of the 
Specials model in more structured, planned and 
resourced ways. There is an argument to seeing 
parallels to national secondment opportunities 
and arrangements for regulars, through which a 
number of regular officers have roles working 
with or seconded into the College of Policing, or 
working directly with the Home Office and 
NPCC. 
Presently there are only a handful of Specials 
leaders who occupy roles with a national reach 
or portfolio. There are a few roles in ASCO 
which partly occupy that type of space. There is 
a Special Chief who, combining with his police 
staff CiP leadership day job, strategically 
supports the national NPCC portfolio lead for 
Specials. There are a small number of Specials 
leaders who act as ambassadors for the College 
of Policing. There have been occasional ad hoc 
secondment-type opportunities developed for 
Specials leaders with the College. There is a 
Special Chief who is seconded to lead the CSCV 
(Cyber Specials and Cyber Volunteers) project 
nationally. More recently, a number of Specials 
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leaders have been designated as workstream 
leads through the national Special Constabulary 
strategic action plan. But overall, such roles are 
currently quite limited in number and in some 
cases, limited in how they have operated. 
There is an argument for developing a much 
more extensive and developed range of 
nationally focused roles for Specials leaders. The 
number and scale of these would need to be 
limited and managed, as it is in the regular 
service, so as not to unduly divert from the 
leadership attention locally. But the careful and 
managed introduction, over time, of maybe 
twenty or so such roles nationally, might begin 
to fill a gap in the national engagement and 
infrastructure of senior Specials in leading the 
Special Constabulary at national level. As is the 
case with the regular service, such opportunities 
could be undertaken alongside individuals 
continuing in local, force leadership, or they 
could be dedicated secondment-like 
arrangements. Such an infrastructure of roles 
could develop through the College, NPCC, Home 
Office, ASCO, or indeed all of the above. 
For some Special Chiefs, they would also like to 
see the NPCC portfolio lead role filled by a 
Special Constable. The majority of Special Chiefs 
are very supportive of the current NPCC 
portfolio lead, and do not see that as a short-
term move, but as Specials leadership 
arrangements grow and evolve at national level 
over coming years, they would see it as an 
ultimate medium-term goal. Such an 
arrangement would raise broader questions 
about the relationship between NPCC (and how 
it is constituted), and those in senior, strategic 
Special Constabulary leadership roles. 
Such an approach could also be considered in 
time for roles leading on Specials and CiP in the 
College and Home Office. Some would argue 
that the evolution of such a model should 
involve some remuneration of the volunteer 
Specials leads in such roles, to encourage and 
enable engagement in the roles. 
Getting involved strategically in 
policing nationally 
Much of the focus in discussions on the national 
picture was on leadership and strategy 
specifically for the Special Constabulary. 
However, there were also many reflections 
about how Special Constabulary leaders, and 
indeed Specials more generally, could 
contribute much more than they currently are 
enabled to do into wider strategy and 
leadership of policing at a national level. 
“Even just looking at Specials chiefs, we 
have cyber expertise, aviation expertise, 
financial expertise, consultancy expertise, 
training and university expertise, and the 
list goes on. All skills that can impact, that 
could help transform policing at a national 
level, if policing is interested” (Special 
Chief Officer)
“If you step back, [to consider] expertise, 
experience, we could bring so much to the 
party nationally [for policing]. If you’re 
talking about twenty years of working in 
education or medicine or cyber, or the 
military experience some of us bring, and
those who have been at a top, top level 
organisationally, managerially, that is by 
definition not what any regular police 
officer of whatever rank can bring. We are
added value.” (Special Chief Officer)
There were frustrations from some Special Chief 
Officers who felt there were cultural barriers to 
organisation such as NPCC, College of Policing 
and the Home Office seeing and engaging with 
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this dimension of the external experience and 
added value that senior leaders in the Special 
Constabulary could bring.  
“Even right up at that national level, we’re 
seen as just a volunteer. We are seen as 
bringing that little bit less. In many ways 
we’re not seen, not seen at all. We’re not 
on their radar, not considered at all. When 
was the last time the College thought, 
where’s the expertise across the service 
on this or that particular issue, might that 
be a Special Constable, might it be a 
Special Chief?” (Special Chief Officer)
“When you analyse where those strategic 
discussions take place, it is the College, 
its NPCC. Both clubs to which we don’t 
have membership, or at least that’s how it 
feels. Run by regulars for regulars. That’s 
a shame and a waste because there are 
unique contributions… we’re different, but 
that should be embraced and seen in a 
good way, it shouldn’t mean that we’re 
ignored.” (Special Chief Officer)
These findings point towards an opportunity for 
national policing leads, primarily the College and 
NPCC, to consider how the talents and 
contribution of Special Constabulary leaders 
could be better identified and engaged in wider 
strategic work nationally across policing. This 
may involve more actively and overtly opening 
up secondments and similar national roles to 
Specials. Again, this would also prompt 
considerations of a model of remunerating 
those volunteer officers.  
Collaboration and interoperability 
There are many strong examples of Special 
Constabularies collaborating and working 
together, either operationally or in terms of 
organisation and development. However, 
looking across the Special Constabulary at a 
national scale, the degree of collaboration 
remains relatively limited. 
“Perhaps the most neglected aspect of all 
is Special Constabularies working 
together.” (Special Chief Officer)
There is little collaborative learning, co-
production and joint development of practice 
across the Special Constabulary. For example, a 
number of forces, or consortia of forces, are 
working separately around issues of training, or 
leadership development, or the development of 
new roles or specialisms for Specials, with little 
collaborative learning. 
“Specialisms, yes, very good. However, 
yet again, each force on its own. Where is 
the national coordination, support, 
advice? I don’t know what the College 
thinks is its job in respect of the Special 
Constabulary, but there’s one suggestion 
for a role.” (Special Chief Officer)
Interoperability was felt to bring considerable 
opportunities, and there were a handful of 
examples of practice where Special 
Constabularies have served together across 
force boundaries operationally. However, again 
this was felt to be limited, and a majority of 
Special Constabularies have little or no 
operationally collaborative activity with other 
forces. 
“We could do so much more if we came 
together operationally more, pool all that 
experience and expertise, scale our effect. 
Every Special Constabulary is an island 
and we rarely talk or engage in that way.” 
(Special Chief Officer)
There was a sense that working together 
requires greater consistency of models and 
standards, but that the rewards of doing so 
could be considerable. 
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“The prize [for working together] is huge. 
The barriers are too, different ranks, 
different standards, what we call an 
operationally qualified officer isn’t the 
same as they do.” (Special Chief Officer)
The models for regional coordination and 
cooperation across Special Constabularies vary; 
in some cases, they are quite strong in being led 
by and engaging Specials leaders, in others less 
so. In some cases, the regional coordinating 
arrangements are reasonably matured and 
effective, whereas in others they still operate in 
a more limited way. Some Special Chiefs argue 
for the benefits of considering a regional 
coordination role, for a Special Constabulary 
leader, in each region. This would likely be a 
Special of senior rank, but would not necessarily 
be a Special Chief Officer rank. Such a role, it is 
argued, might involve: 
- Chairing regional Specials meetings and
coordinating across Special Chiefs in the
region;
- Identifying and championing best
practice, and facilitating learning across
the region between forces;
- Leading on facilitating a step-change in
the level of collaborative activity
between Special Constabularies
(operationally, but also in areas such as
training);
- Where, as is the case in most regions,
there are specialist policing teams and
functions structured across multiple
forces or regionally, leading on
supporting the Special Constabularies in
the region to engage in those
specialisms.
Options for the future 
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Conclusions: A leadership model 
that is ‘not fit for purpose’ 
There are many highly committed and capable 
volunteers, paid staff and officers who are 
effective leaders within the Special 
Constabulary. However, this report highlights 
some significant challenges that show the 
current leadership model is not fit for purpose. 
Overall, a majority of Specials are positive across 
most measures of their experience of 
leadership. For many Specials the experience is 
a good one. Most Specials leaders would 
recommend being in a promoted rank to others. 
There is evidently much that is positive about 
current leaders and their leadership. 
It is also important to recognise that one facet 
of the extremely high levels of variability 
nationally is that such variations can mask 
pockets of excellence. There are some forces 
which ‘buck the trend’ in terms of many (not all, 
but many) of the critiques of leadership 
reflected across this report. 
Nevertheless, the assessment that leadership of 
the Special Constabulary is not fit for purpose is 
primarily shaped by five factors: 
1) Standards and experience of leadership
appear to be highly inconsistent across the
service. There are some very poor contexts
and experiences in some teams and some
forces. Alongside the positive experiences
mentioned above, there is also a sizeable
minority of dissatisfaction with leadership,
poor experience and poor deployment. This
in turn drives existential problems for the
Special Constabulary in terms of the eroding
effects that resultant disengagement and
resignation have on ‘effect’ and value for
money. There has been little if any progress 
made nationally to set and achieve standards 
or to create a more cohesive, consistent 
picture. 
2) Diversity across Specials leadership remains
very limited. The vast majority of Specials
leaders, particularly in more senior roles, are
white men. There is little that is being done
convincingly locally or nationally to address
that. There are no particularly positive trends
or indications in diversity data.
3) These are strategically important times for
the Special Constabulary. The capacity of
leadership to envision and lead strategic
change is questionable in many contexts at
local force level, and largely appears lacking
(particularly in terms of its capacity,
coordination, influence and leverage) at
national level. Those deficits sit alongside
some highly significant challenges for the
Special Constabulary, during what is
generally accepted to be an upcoming period
of significant, strategic change.
4) Culturally the almost 1,700 Specials in
promoted ranks sit in a muddled ambiguous
position; many in policing not seeing their
roles as ‘real’ or as carrying authority, either
formally in terms of command, or more
informally in terms of wider responsibility
and seniority within their forces
organisationally.
5) Leadership in the Special Constabulary
nationally has long been a profoundly
neglected issue, and the result has been a
chaotic picture of piecemeal reform at local
force level, with many such local processes
tending to ‘go around in circles’ on the issue.
In that context, the ‘prospects for
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improvement’ seem limited, unless a very 
different strategic approach is adopted. 
The challenges of reform 
The two key challenges for a national process of 
reform across Specials leadership are: 
- Firstly, that there is such a very wide
diversity of views on fundamental
elements of future direction, and;
- Secondly, that the very wide variation in
current models and practice in different
forces means that any attempts at
national convergence and reform start
from a widely disparate set of local
approaches.
These challenges make charting a future 
coherent path of reform complicated.  
To just provide a handful of illustrative 
examples, some key aspects of the different 
visions and views for the future include: 
- Views on future direction on ranks and
volunteer leadership roles range widely,
from on the one hand majorly
strengthening volunteer leadership roles
in terms of number, scope and authority,
to on the other hand abolishing ranks
altogether;
- Views range from a desire for full
equality of ranks with regulars, to re-
emphasising the distinction between
them;
- Linked to that, somewhat polemical
positions held in different forces about
insignia and epaulettes;
- More fundamentally and strategically,
there are very different visions for the
future role and capability of the Special
Constabulary. Some are very ambitious
on scale, role and capability, others
much more modest in ambitions. Some
would like to see more radical change to
the model, for example towards
‘Reserve’ approaches;
- There are markedly different perceptions
of the relationships and connections
between the Special Constabulary and
the wider canvas of ‘Citizens in Policing’.
Some see the future as one that is very
much integrated across CiP, and indeed
in terms of senior and influential
stakeholders for future reform who are
regulars and police staff in forces, many
have roles which are framed as Citizens
in Policing. On the other hand, for others
the future lies in a path for the Specials
distinct from that wider CiP umbrella of
volunteering in policing.
This lack of consensus on future direction is a 
key factor in the very limited progress that has 
been made over many years nationally in 
developing a more effective and coherent 
picture of Specials leadership.  
These challenges are further compounded by 
the long history of Special Constabulary models 
being led at, and decisions made at, local force 
level; largely unfettered by national 
considerations, requirements or guidance. Any 
move to a more coherent and convergent 
national model will require some compromising 
of local discretion to a ‘greater good’ of national 
consistency. The impression is that negotiating 
and marshalling Chief Constables and forces 
towards a nationally regulated and consistent 
model may be a challenge.  
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As reflected in this report, there are some issues 
of poor relationships, and a general lack of 
communication nationally, amongst Specials 
leaders, which looks set to continue to challenge 
and hinder the move towards toward reform.  
As set out in the preceding chapter, the national 
context is presently one of particularly limited 
resource. Many Specials leaders currently do 
not have confidence in national arrangements, 
are not cognisant of national work, and are not 
engaged in it. 
Support for reform 
Despite these challenges, there is also a 
widespread support for reform, and for a more 
consistent and regulated national approach. The 
current inconsistency and variation in models 
and standards is widely agreed to be something 
that needs addressing, and there is a widely 
drawn caucus of support to achieve ‘one version 
of the truth’ for Specials leadership (albeit, 
reflecting the preceding discussion, less 
consensus on some of the details of what that 
‘one version’ should look like). There seem very 
few, if any, strategic voices who argue that the 
current leadership arrangements stand 
competent and ready in the face of future 
strategic challenges and the need for change. 
Participants in the research underlying this 
report have expressed hopes that this final 
report does not ‘sit on the fence’ and is bold and 
clear in its recommendations.  
Options for the future 
The above discussions conclude that the current 
leadership model is in some key respects not fit 
for purpose, and that there is a widespread 
support for national coherence, convergence, 
standards and change. A number of 
fundamental challenges are also highlighted 
that need to be overcome to achieve that 
change. 
Given the complexity of achieving the 
progression of national reform, it is key that any 
future reform process spends time building 
consensus and engagement across forces, 
including at the most senior levels. As such, this 
report steps short of making a series of 
definitive and specific recommendations for the 
future, as that should arise from future 
processes of consensus-building. The report 
does provide some pointers to options, based 
upon the evidence presented and discussed, for 
future reform. 
National framework 
There is a compelling case for the need for a 
single national framework for Specials 
leadership. The history of the Special 
Constabulary is somewhat riddled with past 
agreements at national level (e.g. a single 
framework for training, and indeed a single 
model for ranks) which have quickly dissipated 
back into local discretion and the pursuit of 
multiple different models. It is recognised 
therefore that this represents a significant 
strategic challenge to achieve. However, some 
greater coherence and clarity of standards is 
critical to taking the issue of Specials leadership 
forwards. 
OPTION 1: National Framework 
The College of Policing could work with the 
National Police Chiefs Council, Special 
Constabulary Chief Officers and other key 
stakeholders to produce a single national 
framework for Special Constabulary leadership.  
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This might include: 
- A single national version of agreed role
descriptions and expectations for each
rank;
- Agreed national consistency across rank
nomenclature, insignia, etc.;
- Agreed standards of qualification,
training, etc. for ranks;
- Clarity of formal authority and command
of ranks, including the legal position
regarding command authority;
- Guidance on best practice for
appointment, induction, probationary
periods, appraisal, supervision, support
and tenure for ranks.
OPTION 2: Clarify authority 
Building on one of the elements outlined above, 
there would be major benefit in the national 
framework for Specials leadership being explicit 
as to the authority, seniority and command 
invested in Specials ranks. 
This may require legal clarification in respect of 
command authority. There is a need for 
clarification, and national consistency, in terms 
of the legal, legislative basis of the capacity of 
Specials ranks to issue lawful orders to Specials, 
to issue lawful orders to regulars, and any other 
related elements of command and operational 
authorities. 
Beyond those aspects of formal operational 
command, it is recognised that a national 
framework can, in effect, never regulate for the 
broader and somewhat subjective and 
situational dynamics of authority and seniority 
of roles within forces. However, such a 
framework could also usefully include some 
guidance as to broad expectations in that 
regard. 
OPTION 3: Rank titles 
Building on option 1 above, a national 
framework could seek to agree a single model of 
rank titles and insignia. Agreement should be 
sought to apply this in all force contexts. 
Over time a greater convergence in numbers of 
ranks, and indeed consideration of those forces 
without them, might be desirable. However, in 
the short-medium term, a more pragmatic 
achievement nationally would be to accept 
some variation in the scale and shape (and 
indeed existence) of rank structures, but to 
achieve a national consistency in rank 
nomenclature, role and insignia for those ranks 
that do exist in each force.  
Issues of insignia and rank titles may seem a 
side-issue and trivia to some, but the current 
variation across forces impacts upon inter-
operability and credibility of Specials ranks 
across the service. A gathering of regular Chief 
Officers across forces would reflect differences 
in uniform nationally, but all present the same 
rank insignia. A gathering of Special Chief 
Officers would exhibit five or six different 
interpretations of rank insignia. 
How ranks operate and their 
equivalency 
At present there is no realistic short-to-medium 
term path to establish operational equivalency 
(in terms of training, qualification, operational 
experience and command credibility) between 
regular supervisors and their rank title 
equivalent Special supervisors. A minority of 
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individuals might be able and willing to 
contribute the time and demonstrate the skills 
and experience to do so. However, it is 
impractical to consider moving all 1,700 to that 
point of complete equivalency, or to set the bar 
for national standard at that level. This would 
generate a training and development 
requirement that most individuals and their 
forces cannot achieve, or afford. 
OPTION 4: Role profiles 
The more pragmatic path to rank 
professionalism in the Special Constabulary 
might be: 
- To establish agreed role profiles and
expectations for each rank, and as far as
possible to do so consistently on a
national level;
- Such rank profiles will include aspects of
leadership requirement which are
distinct to and go beyond regular
‘equivalent’ ranks (e.g. most obviously in
terms of leading volunteers);
- They would also be envisaged to
incorporate a proportion of the
equivalent regular rank requirement,
and as such to put the Special
Constabulary nationally on a journey
which seeks to raise the expectations of
promoted, leadership roles.
Such a process of establishing rank profiles 
would need to be undertaken in a way that 
engages across Special Constabularies, and 
seeks to understand the variations in current 
position and practice. The practical challenges of 
implementing new profiles need to be explored 
and collectively resolved. Without genuine 
engagement, a paper exercise will be completed 
‘at the centre’, and forces will not implement 
(indeed, may not be able to implement) the 
necessary changes.  
OPTION 5: Rank differences 
Further work should be undertaken to 
understand the more senior leadership roles in 
the Special Constabulary (i.e. Chief Inspector, 
Superintendent, etc.). There are clearly 
substantive differences in practice in relation to 
how such roles operate, and several forces have 
removed such roles in recent years, partly 
because they have not been satisfied with how 
they have been operating. Feeding into the 
process in Option 4, it would be useful to 
specifically focus on how such senior elements 
of Specials leadership teams function most 
effectively, and to build ‘best practice’ into the 
future profiles. 
OPTION 6: Regular supervisors 
Alongside the development of Special rank 
profiles, national guidance should be produced 
outlining ‘best practice’ in respect of the role of 
Regular supervisors in respect of the leadership 
and supervision of Specials. Presently there is 
wide variation in practice, and related issues of 
expectations, training and support for Regular 
supervisors in terms of undertaking such roles.  
It would be sensible for Options 4, 5 and Option 
7 to be undertaken as a joint exercise. 
Development of leaders  
There is a need to create a new, and much more 
coherent, framework for leadership 
development across the Special Constabulary. 
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OPTION 7: Leader induction 
Some forces have structured models of leader 
induction, the completion of leader 
probationary periods, and models for initial 
competency development and sign off. Such 
practice could usefully be codified into one 
consistent model nationally, and rolled out as a 
single coherent model across all new leaders in 
Special Constabularies. 
OPTION 8: Leader training 
There are approximately 16 different training 
models in forces for S/Sergeants and 
S/Inspectors. The learning across those models 
should be pulled together to establish a single 
framework, and ideally a much more unified 
model of training content and delivery. 
The training work developed in South Yorkshire, 
and delivered now in several forces, has been 
referenced repeatedly during our research work 
as representing a good model to emulate and 
potentially roll out more widely. 
OPTION 9: Senior leader training 
The College of Policing is currently relaunching 
national training for more senior ranks of 
Specials, and this development will be 
welcomed by many. Previous training has been 
well received.  
OPTION 10: Wider training 
There are clear advantages for Specials leaders 
training together with their leadership 
colleagues across their forces. 
The access to leadership courses and other 
support for Specials is variable in different 
forces. Special leaders should have access to 
training in the same way as other force leaders, 
and this should be collectively agreed, 
nationally. Forces should consider ways of 
facilitating better access to such training for 
Special leaders, not least by considering when 
course delivery takes place. If this is always 
during the 9-5, Monday-Friday training 
paradigm in policing, then more flexible models 
might be considered and deliverable in the 
future.  
The question of whether Special Chief Officers 
might be enabled to attend the Strategic 
Command Course could be given consideration. 
Clearly, such an option would be prohibitive for 
many, given the time commitment involved. But 
it may not be prohibitive for all, and attendance 
even of only a very small number of Chiefs 
spread over a period of years would represent a 
symbolic change, as well as providing a high-
quality development opportunity for the 
individuals concerned. 
OPTION 11: Mentoring 
Mentoring models are utilised in some force 
contexts for Special leaders. There are real 
advantages for Special leaders to have the 
opportunity to be mentored by regular force 
leaders.  
Equally, Special leaders bring a great deal of 
skills and experience and should have 
opportunities to mentor regular colleagues. 
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Future leaders and succession  
There is little current strategic attention paid to 
succession in Special leadership. A small number 
of forces have some degree of succession 
planning. And, again only in a small number of 
forces, there are specific initiatives geared at 
identifying and supporting the development of 
future leaders (e.g. current innovative work 
being undertaken in Merseyside).  
OPTION 12: Future leaders programme 
Develop a national ‘Future Leaders’ programme 
across the Special Constabulary.  
This could fit with and embed in existing similar 
models where they exist at force-level, but 
could also carry the benefits of engaging Special 
leaders across forces.  
Understandings of practice and perspectives on 
the Special Constabulary strategically and 
beyond force level are limited in current 
models, particularly at the more senior level, 
and such a programme could support the 
development of strategic thinking and 
adaptability of the Special Constabulary moving 
forward. 
OPTION 13: Direct-entry 
An additional piece of research work should be 
undertaken to consider direct-entry models of 
leadership recruitment into the Special 
Constabulary. Little is currently known about 
the effectiveness of existing practice in this 
regard, which has been relatively small in scale. 
Learning could also be identified from other 
police direct-entry models.  
There is a related consideration, which such 
work could also engage with, of how ex-regulars 
might enter the Special Constabulary at rank, 
and the different dimensions for consideration 
of such models. 
Focusing on improving supervision 
and support 
Fundamental to improving the experience, 
retention and impact of Special Constables is 
improving their supervision and support. 
OPTION 14: Supervision and support 
Engaging across Special Constabularies, develop 
national standards for Special Constable 
supervision and support. 
This would helpfully link with, and feed into, 
Option 4. 
OPTION 15: S/Sergeant development 
The S/Sergeant role is particularly important in 
driving the positive (or otherwise) experience of 
supervision and support for Specials. Many 
forces are facing difficulties recruiting and 
retaining S/Sergeants.  
S/Sergeants need to be given more voice and 
need to be supported in creating a ‘what works’ 
approach to managing the role. A consultative 
network could be set up to facilitate this.  
This work should align with Option 4, the 
development of consistent role profiles, and 
engage with existing work being undertaken by 
the College of Policing on front-line supervision. 
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Focusing upon improving 
deployment 
Effective deployment is fundamental to Special 
Constable experience, retention and 
effectiveness. Delivering effective deployment 
should be a priority for Specials leadership 
teams. 
OPTION 16: Deployment strategy 
The leadership of each Special Constabulary 
should develop a force deployment strategy for 
Special Constables. 
Vision and strategic leadership 
At a more strategic level, it is important that the 
leadership of the Special Constabulary nationally 
and locally in each force has a vision and sets a 
strategy for the future role, capability and 
contribution of Special Constables. 
OPTION 17: Vision for the future 
The leadership of the Special Constabulary 
should set a vision for the future, and from that 
develop a ‘Blueprint’ for delivery. 
OPTION 18: Strategic plan 
The leadership of the Special Constabulary 
should develop a strategic plan to build the 
future desired capability of Special Constables, 
spanning recruitment, skills, training, 
development and retention. 
Focusing upon improving 
opportunities and development 
Further improving the opportunities that Special 
Constables have to develop their skills and 
experience, and to maximise the impact of their 
volunteering, is a fundamental developmental 
task for Special leaders. 
OPTION 19: Skills strategy 
The leadership of the Special Constabulary 
should effectively audit the skills of all Specials, 
and have a skills strategy for the further 
development, and the utilisation, of skills, 
mapped against demand and prioritised areas of 
policing.  
OPTION 20: Specialist roles 
Special Constabulary leaders should further 
develop specialist roles and contribution across 
their Special Constables, focused on prioritised 
areas of policing need.  
Diversity of Special Constabulary 
leaders 
There is a fundamental strategic challenge of 
improving the diversity of Special Constabulary 
leadership. Progress on this issue has been 
limited over a number of years and there seems 
little energy or plan to improve upon this. 
Whilst much of the progress on this issue will be 
achieved in the future at force level, there are 
some key developments that could be 
considered more generally and at national level. 
OPTION 21: Diversity working group 
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Establish a national working group of Specials, 
with a diverse membership, to give this agenda 
the energy, expertise and experience that it 
needs to move forward. 
Such a model could also engage expertise, and 
diverse perspectives and experience, from 
outside of the Special Constabulary and from 
outside of policing (whilst ensuring that diverse 
perspectives within the Special Constabulary are 
paramount and heard).  
The ‘Future leaders’ programme discussed at 
Option 12, the mentoring models discussed at 
Option 11, and the direct entry further 
explorations discussed at Option 13, could all be 
developed and focused to provide a positive 
action and pro-active approach to addressing 
issues of broadening and deepening leadership 
diversity. 
OPTION 22: Positive action 
Models from beyond the policing sector could 
be considered to import into the Specials 
context. Such examples might include: 
- Agreement that Specials leaders would
not engage in panels, conference
speaking events, and the like if there is
not female, and not BME, senior
representation. Such an approach is
increasingly being adopted in several
different sectors, as an antidote to the
continuity of all white male panels at
conferences and similar events;
- A Specials conference event could be
organised, exclusively for female
Specials, or exclusively for BME Specials,
(or similar thinking);
- ‘Champions’ could be considered, to
figurehead and drive the agenda for
change;
- Quotas and more assertive positive
action approaches could be considered
to achieve a step-change in poor
representation. Such models, e.g. all
female shortlists in political
representation settings, have been
shown to effect quite rapid change in
settings that would perhaps otherwise
have changed only very slowly.
Due consideration of these models at the 
national and senior level across forces needs to 
be evidenced. Where decisions are taken not to 
engage these models, the rationale for those 
decisions and alternative routes of action to 
improve diversity in Specials leadership should 
be clear and transparent.  
Executive-level, senior strategic 
leadership of the Special 
Constabulary 
OPTION 23: Special Chief Officer role 
There are considerable advantages in having a 
senior, ‘Chief’, volunteer Special role. It is 
recommended that each force works towards 
having a Chief Officer role, taking time to design 
and implement the role in a way which properly 
integrates with force strategic and operational 
planning, performance management and 
delivery. To enable this, and as part of Option 4, 
an agreed national role profile for the Special 
Chief Officer should be created.  
However, it is recognised that policing nationally 
is far from a consensus position on this issue, 
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with some widely differing views held at senior 
level.  
Further engagement with Northumbria and 
Sussex (for example) should be undertaken to 
better understand those force contexts without 
rank structure, the pros and cons of such 
models, plans for leadership development in the 
future, and how those fit with the wider options 
being discussed in this report. 
The current patchwork where some forces do 
have a Chief role, and some don’t, and where 
such roles are being removed in some forces 
effectively because of personality or personnel 
issues, has an undermining effect on the 31 
roles that remain. 
Coming together and the national 
picture 
The national picture of Special leadership is a 
challenging one. There is much that needs to be 
achieved in coming years at national level, and 
serious strategic questions about current 
capacity at national level to deliver on this. 
The Special Constabulary at leadership level, 
and particularly at senior leader level, is in a 
period where national dialogue, communication 
and engagement across leaders is poor. For 
progress to be made across the Special 
Constabulary, and across the options discussed 
in this report, this context needs to improve. 
OPTION 24: National meetings 
Senior leaders need to meet at a national level. 
There should be a forum facilitated, perhaps by 
the College of Policing, for Special Chiefs to 
meet once or twice a year. 
Conclusions 
Leadership in the Special Constabulary is 
important and there are some major challenges. 
The leadership of Specials has been a neglected 
issue at national level, and this has resulted in a 
very wide variation of practice and models 
across forces, and some significant problems 
which raise the question as to whether current 
leadership is ‘fit for purpose’, which this report 
concludes that it is not. 
It is recognised that Specials leadership is also a 
contested arena, and that there are some 
widely contrasting but strongly held convictions 
on the subject in terms of future direction. 
Adding to that mix the sheer variety of current 
models and approaches means that taking this 
agenda forward in a coherent and collaborative 
way nationally is going to be a complex task. 
This will require considerable engagement 
across all Special Constabularies and consensus-
building as solutions are developed. 
This report provides useful evidence and 
thinking to form some of the foundations for 
the future development of Specials leadership, 
but at the same time it points to several 
remaining knowledge gaps.  
It is striking in some ways how little has changed 
over recent years in respect of the issues 
engaged with in this report. Progress needs 
energy, organisation and leadership at the 
national level, and will require engagement and 
compromise at force level. It is simply not 
possible to develop a consistent national model 
across forces (and all the significant advantages 
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that would bring in terms of standards, inter-
operability, professionalisation and 
effectiveness) whilst also retaining a position of 
complete independence to pursue any path at 
force level. Ultimately, progression of the 
Special Constabulary leadership agenda will rest 
on the degree to which the right blend of local  
discretion and national standards and 
mandating can be found. 
The options in this report are intended to be a 
start; to provide some beginning material to 
work from for those with national responsibility 
for leading the Special Constabulary and 
developing its leadership models for the future. 
Finally, it just remains to thank the many 
Specials, and Special Constabulary leaders, who 
have contributed to this report, and without 
whose contribution its production would not 
have been possible. This report represents the 
largest ever engagement exercise in terms of 
Specials leadership. Effort has been made 
throughout to ensure the voice of Specials 
themselves be heard; hence the large volume of 
quotes across the report, allowing the 
perspectives and arguments of Specials across 
the whole debate on leadership to be expressed 
in their own words. It seems clear that whatever 
paths are taken to further develop the 
leadership of the Special Constabulary in the 
future, retaining that major focus on engaging 
Specials themselves, and their leaders, in all 
facets of that work will be critical to its success. 
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